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ARTICLES
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO
PARTICIPATE IN ABORTIONS: ROE, CASEY,
AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS OF HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS
Mark L. Rienzi*
The Fourteenth Amendment rights of various parties in the abortion
context-the pregnant woman, the fetus, the fetus's father, the state-have
been discussed at length by commentators and the courts. Surprisingly, the
Fourteenth Amendment rights of the healthcare provider asked to provide the
abortion have not. Roe and Casey establish a pregnant woman's Four-
teenth Amendment right to decide for herself whether to have an abortion.
Do those same precedents also protect her doctor's right to decide whether to
participate in abortion procedures?
The Court's substantive due process analysis typically looks for rights
that are "deeply rooted" in our history and traditions. Accordingly, this arti-
cle addresses the historical basis for finding that providers do indeed have a
Fourteenth Amendment right not to participate in abortions. This historical
analysis shows that this right to refuse passes the Court's stated test for Four-
teenth Amendment protection. In fact, the right to refuse actually has better
historical support, and better satisfies the Court's stated tests, than the abor-
tion right itself
Beyond this historical case, a healthcare provider's right to make this
decision also fits squarely within the zone of individual decision making
protected by the Court's opinions in Casey and Lawrence v. Texas, and
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protects providers from the types of psychological harm that the Court recog-
nized in Roe and Casey. For these reasons, under Roe and Casey, a
healthcare provider has a Fourteenth Amendment right not to participate in
abortions.
INTRODUCTION
Dr. Lisa Harris had performed abortions for years. But while per-
forming one particular abortion, she experienced what she called a
"brutally visceral" emotional response. At the time, Dr. Harris was
pregnant, and she had felt her own baby kick while she was perform-
ing the abortion. She described the experience as "one of the more
raw moments" of her life.'
From that point on, Dr. Harris found that performing abortions
"did not get easier," and that she grew to find the process "sadder."2
Still, Dr. Harris chose to continue providing abortions. Indeed she
wrote about her experience to draw attention to the psychological
impact of providing abortions.3 Dr. Harris hopes that an open discus-
sion of the psychological burdens of providing abortions will
strengthen the pro-choice movement and help make abortions more
widely available.4
Different doctors, of course, have different approaches to the
question of whether or not to perform abortions. Some choose not to
perform them at all. Others perform abortions for their entire
careers, enduring protests, threats, and physical violence to provide a
service they deem critically important.5 Still others perform abortions
for a time and later decide they wish to stop,6 or decide midcareer to
1 Lisa H Harris, Second Trimester Abortion Provision: Breaking the Silence and Chang-
ing the Discourse, 16 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 74, 76 (2008).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 75.
4 Id.
5 See David Barstow, An Abortion Battle, Fought to the Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2009, at Al (discussing the life and death of abortion provider George Tiller). Dr.
Tiller devoted his entire career to performing abortions, focusing particularly on late-
term abortions that few other doctors will provide, and enduring bombings, death
threats and multiple attempts on his life. Dr. Tiller was murdered by an abortion
opponent on May 31, 2009. Id.
6 See, e.g., BERNARD NATHANSON, THE HAND OF GOD 140-41 (1996) (explaining
that Nathanson, cofounder of the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion
Laws (the original "NARAL"), oversaw "tens of thousands of abortions" before leaving
the practice. Nathanson later created the controversial video called "The Silent
Scream," showing an abortion as it happened on ultrasound).
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begin providing abortions.7 In short, physicians-like the rest of us-
have come to a variety of opinions about abortion. Those opinions
quite naturally influence whether they are willing to participate in
abortions or not.
What does the Constitution say about this state of affairs? Sup-
pose after the abortion described above, Dr. Harris had experienced a
change of heart and decided she no longer wished to provide abor-
tions. Does she have the constitutional right to make that decision on
her own? Or could the government force her to continue to provide
abortions against her will, perhaps as a condition of being a licensed
obstetrician?
Courts and commentators have repeatedly examined the Four-
teenth Amendment rights of various parties in the abortion context,
including the pregnant woman,8 the fetus,9 the states,10 and the
7 See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, The New Abortion Providers, N.Y. TIMES MAC., July 18,
2010, at 30 (describing a Chicago family practice physician who began providing abor-
tions several years into her career).
8 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 851 (1992)
(reaffirming Roe's central holdings and emphasizing that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects a liberty interest of self-determination in matters involving abortion and the
ability to make those decisions without "compulsion of the State"); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (holding that the pregnant woman has a Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to decide whether or not to abort a fetus, subject to limited state regula-
tion as the pregnancy progresses); B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Healthcare Rights,
18 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 501, 502 (2009) (arguing that the abortion right should be
considered a "right to health"); Lynne Marie Kohm, Sex Selection Abortion and the Boom-
erang Effect of a Woman's Right to Choose: A Paradox of the Skeptics, 4 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 91, 96 (1997) ("This article will review how women are victimized by
other women's free exercise of self-centered and unlimited personal liberty. The sali-
ent point is that sex selection abortion is illustrative of the fact that abortion in gen-
eral is destructive to women. What was once hailed as the choice that would free all
women has come to shackle the future of women as a gender."); Elizabeth Spiezer,
Comment, Recent Developments in Reproductive Health Law and the Constitutional Rights of
Women: The Role of the Judiciary in Regulating Maternal Health and Safety, 41 CAL. W. L.
REv. 507, 507 (2005) ("In order to ensure women full rights as 'persons' entitled to
personal liberty under the Constitution, the Supreme Court must mandate that laws
regulating women's reproductive health and safety clearly and unequivocally value
women as autonomous persons rather than as functions of a socially defined maternal
role." (footnote omitted)).
9 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 158-59 (holding that a fetus is not a "person" and
therefore lacks Fourteenth Amendment or other constitutional rights until birth, but
stating that "the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not
in a position to speculate as to the answer" to the question of when life begins); Dawn
E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to
Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1986) ("Any legal recogni-
tion of the fetus should be scrutinized to ensure that it does not infringe on women's
constitutionally protected interests in liberty and equality during pregnancy."); Law-
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father. 1 These decisions often presume and rely upon the presence
of a willing doctor to perform the abortion.12 To date, though, no
scholars have explored in any depth whether the healthcare provider
has Fourteenth Amendment rights to decide for herself whether to
participate in abortions.' 3 In short, we know that under the Four-
teenth Amendment the government cannot compel a woman to abort
her own fetus-the question asked here is, can it force her to abort
someone else's?
rence J. Nelson, Of Persons and Prenatal Humans: Why the Constitution is Not Silent on
Abortion, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 155, 156 (2009) (arguing that prenatal humans
should not be recognized as persons because to do so would cause women to lose
fundamental rights and therefore create a "constitutional anomaly"); Tracy Leigh
Dodds, Note, Defending America's Children: How the Current System Gets it Wrong, 29
HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 719, 719-20 (2006) (exploring "the connection between the
mistreatment of children and the dehumanization of unborn children" and offering
"an alternative framework . .. that explicitly recognizes the innate right of all individ-
uals to have their existence recognized and honored by the government and courts");
Amy Lotierzo, Note, The Unborn Child, A Forgotten Interest: Reexamining Roe In Light of
Increased Recognition of Fetal Rights, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 279, 280 (2006) ("[C]hanges in
the law that have expanded fetal rights have eroded the fundamental assumption on
which the right to abortion depends-that the unborn do not have protected life and
liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.").
10 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 871; Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (formulating the woman's
right to choose abortion in opposition to the power of states, in certain circum-
stances, to regulate abortion to protect the state's interest in fetal life or to protect the
health of the mother).
11 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 (1976)
(invalidating a state law designed to allow fathers the right to participate in the abor-
tion decision); Melanie G. McCulley, The Male Abortion: The Putative Father's Right to
Terminate His Interests in and Obligations to an Unborn Child, 7J.L. & POL'Y 1, 7-8 (1998)
("[A] putative father should have the same right to escape [the responsibilities of
supporting a child] as that of an unwed mother."); Andrea M. Sharrin, Note, Potential
Fathers and Abortion: A Woman's Womb is Not a Man's Castle, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 1359
(1990) (discussing paternal rights and arguing against paternal rights before birth).
12 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (noting that limits on state interference in pre-
viability abortions means that "the attending physician, in consultation with his
patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical
judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated"). Elsewhere in the opinion,
the Court notes that physicians hold a range of views about abortion. See id. at 116.
13 Courtney Miller, Note, Reflections on Protecting Conscience for Health Care Provid-
ers: A Call for More Inclusive Statutory Protection in Light of Constitutional Considerations, 15
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 327, 347-48 (2006) (dismissing the possibility, after
one paragraph, that "the Court could extend the autonomy logic of its substantive
due process . . . to also protect the conscience rights of health care providers" as
"unlikely" as long as "the abortion right ... remains confined to situations of mutual
agreement between an individual and her physician").
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For much of our history, this question has been largely irrelevant.
Until quite recently the right not to be forced to perform abortions
has been protected by a variety of other mechanisms, including pre-
Roe laws banning most abortions,' 4 express state and federal statutory
conscience protections enacted after Roe,15 and a strong view of the
Free Exercise Clause that subjected government burdens on individ-
ual religious exercise to strict scrutiny under Sherbert v. Verner,16 and
Wisconsin v. Yoder.1 7 These overlapping factors largely ensured that
the government could not compel an unwilling individual to partici-
pate in an abortion. There was little need to consider or explore
whether the Fourteenth Amendment provided independent
protection.
Recent developments, however, make the question of a Four-
teenth Amendment right for healthcare providers more relevant.
Legal developments have made it much more difficult for a religious
plaintiff to assert a First Amendment Free Exercise claim.18 Medical
developments such as the availability of RU-486 (also called the "abor-
tion pill") and emergency contraception (also called the "morning
after pill," and marketed as "Plan B" and "ella") have expanded the
pool of healthcare providers likely to be asked to participate person-
ally in procedures they may consider to be abortions.19 The Depart-
14 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 174-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (reviewing legal
prohibitions on abortion at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also infra
Part III.A-B.
15 See, e.g., Church Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401(b), 87 Stat. 91 (1973)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006)) ("The receipt of any grant, contract, loan, or
loan guarantee under the Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health
Centers Act, or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act
by any individual or entity does not authorize any court or any public official or other
public authority to require . . . (2) such entity to (A) make its facilities available for
the performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance of
such procedure or abortion in such facilities is prohibited by the entity on the basis of
religious beliefs or moral convictions . . . ."); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214
(LexisNexis 2009) ("A person may not be required to perform or participate in, or
refer to any source for, any medical procedure that results in artificial insemination,
sterilization, or termination of pregnancy."); see also infra Part III.C-D.
16 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963).
17 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
18 See, e.g., Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990) (deeming Sherbert
analysis inapplicable in the face of certain neutral and generally applicable laws).
19 For example, as understood by individuals who believe that life begins at con-
ception (i.e., the union of egg and sperm), Plan B's mechanism of action can cause
an abortion because it can prevent the implantation of an already-fertilized egg in the
uterus. See PLAN B ONE-STEP, FULL PRESCRIBING INFO., http://www.planbonestep.
com/pdf/PlanBOneStepFullProductlnformation.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2011)
(noting that Plan B "may inhibit implantation"). Plan B has resulted in numerous
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ment of Health and Human Services has recently rescinded
administrative regulations allowing for conscience-based objections by
healthcare workers.20 President Obama and members of Congress
have promised passage of legislation known as the Freedom of Choice
Act, which some argue would strip healthcare workers and institutions
of even state statutory protections against compelled participation in
abortions.2 ' New legislation establishing greater government involve-
ment in the healthcare system will likely present additional conflicts
between government mandates and provider conscience.
These developments have coincided with actions by private
employers, government regulators, and courts to require healthcare
providers to participate in what they understand to be abortions. In
Alaska, for example, private hospitals have been forced by state courts
federal and state lawsuits by pharmacists objecting to laws forcing them to dispense
the drug, because they believe they would be participating in abortion. See, e.g., Morr-
Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 901 N.E.2d 373 (Ill. 2008). The recently approved drug "ella"
can be taken up to five days after sex and, according to its FDA-approved label, may
prevent pregnancy through "alterations to the endometrium that may affect implanta-
tion." How Ella is Different, ELLA, http://www.ella-rx.com/hcp/howiselladifferent.asp
(last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (also noting that the drug caused "embryofetal loss . . . in
all pregnant rats and half of the pregnant rabbits" to which it was administered).
20 See Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscious
Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9968 (Feb. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88)
(rescinding in part and revising in part a 2008 Final Rule concerning conscience pro-
tections). The 2011 Final Rule states that it is not designed to reduce existing statu-
tory conscience protections, but that fund recipients will no longer be required to
certify their compliance with those statutes.
Despite these actions, President Obama has publicly stated his support for at least
some type of "sensible" conscience protection, but has not provided details at to
whom it would protect or how it would work. See, e.g., President Barack Obama,
Remarks by the President in Commencement Address to the University of Notre
Dame (May 17, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-notre-dame-commencement) ("Let's . . . draft a sensible
conscience clause, and make sure that all of our health care policies are grounded
not only in sound science, but also in clear ethics .... ).
21 See Kristen L. Burge, Comment, When It Rains, It Pours: A Comprehensive Analysis
of the Freedom of Choice Act and Its Potential Fallout on Abortion jurisprudence and Legisla-
tion, 40 CUMB. L. REv. 181, 237 (2009); Memorandum from the Office of General
Counsel, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (Aug. 15, 2008), available at
http://old.usccb.org/prolife/issues/FOCA/analysis.pdf; The "Freedom for Partial-Birth
Abortionists Act "-Pro-Abortion Lawmakers Propose "FOCA" to Invalidate All Limits on Abor-
tion, NAT'L RIGHT To LIFE (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.nric.org/foca/LawmakersPro-
poseFOCA.html. This prospect prompted at least one Catholic bishop to publicly
consider the closing of all Catholic hospitals, which provide approximately one-third
of all hospital services nationwide. Tim Townsend, Federal FOCA Bill Sparks Threats of
Hospital Closings, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 2009, at Al.
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to allow their facilities to be used for abortions against their will.2 2
The state of California sued the United States government in 2005,
asserting that the state had the ability "to take disciplinary action
against either health care entities or health care providers who refuse
to provide abortion related services" in certain situations.23 Since
2005, other states have used their power over pharmacy licenses to
require distribution of drugs known as "emergency contraceptives,"24
22 See, e.g., Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska
1997) (requiring a private hospital to permit abortions because it had accepted public
funds). The court's decision that abortions were required as a matter of Alaska state
law is reminiscent of developments shortly after Roe, in which some federal courts
ordered hospitals to permit or provide abortions as a matter of federal law. See, e.g.,
Doe v. Bellin Mem'l Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973) (describing and reversing the
decision of a federal judge in Wisconsin to order a private hospital to perform
abortions).
23 See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary judgment at 13, California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436
(9th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-00328), 2006 WL 1417043. In challenging a federal con-
science provision known as the Hyde-Weldon Amendment, California argued that the
conscience law was unconstitutional, because it would interfere with the state's ability
to require the performance of abortions where necessary to protect the "health of
mothers." Id. In the abortion context, "health" has been defined broadly to include
"all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-rele-
vant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health." Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
("Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the
additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will con-
sider in consultation."). Ultimately, the District Court found that California lacked
standing and had not presented a ripe claim for relief. California ex rel. Lockyer v.
United States, No. 05-00328, 2008 WL 744840 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2008). Likewise,
the ACLU has recently urged the federal government that religious hospitals be
required to provide abortions in "emergency" situations. See Letter from Laura W.
Murphy, ACLU, et al., to Marilyn Tavenner, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Letter toCMSFinal
PDF.pdf
24 See, e.g., Morr-Fitz, 901 N.E.2d at 381 (describing licensing requirements in Illi-
nois). Author disclosure: I represent the pharmacists in this case. In April 2011, the
trial court found that the Illinois regulation violated the Free Exercise Clause,
because it was deliberately targeted at religious objectors and allowed refusals for a
host of business reasons, but not for religion. Accordingly, the court found that the
law was neither neutral nor generally applicable under Smith, and was therefore sub-
ject to strict scrutiny, which it failed. The court also found that the regulation vio-
lated two state statutes. Plaintiffs also presented a one paragraph Fourteenth
2011] 7
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despite the fact that such drugs are believed to work after fertilization
and implantation, which some pharmacists understand to be an abor-
tion.25 Yet state regulators nevertheless have required them to dis-
pense the drugs, on threat of license revocation.26 Although medical
organizations have historically favored protecting conscientious objec-
tors,2 7 in 2007 the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists (ACOG) issued an ethical directive requiring physicians to either
provide or refer for abortions, and that if a referral "might negatively
have an impact on a patient's physical or mental health, providers
have an obligation to provide" abortions "regardless of the provider's
personal moral objections."28 Employees in private hospitals have
reported being forced by their employers to participate in abortions
against their will, on threats of termination and initiation of proceed-
ings against their licenses.29
In light of these developments, and in light of the government's
expanding role in the healthcare system, the time is ripe for examina-
tion of healthcare providers' Fourteenth Amendment rights to refuse
to participate in abortions. That examination, presented in the pages
Amendment argument, which the court deemed insufficient to carry Plaintiffs bur-
den of proving that the Fourteenth Amendment rights discussed in Casey and else-
where apply to healthcare providers. See Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, No. 2005-
000495 (7th Cir. Ill. Apr 5, 2011).
25 Although there has been some scientific dispute as to the mechanism of action
of Plan B, both the FDA and the manufacturer acknowledge that the drug can stop
implantation of an already-fertilized egg. See PLAN B ONE-STEP, supra note 19, which
some pharmacists understand to be an abortion.
26 See Morr-Fitz, 901 N.E.2d at 386 (noting that failure to sell the drug could result
in license revocation); id. at 390-91 (noting Governor Blagojevich's alleged state-
ments that objecting pharmacists "should find another profession" and should "fill
prescriptions without making moral judgments").
27 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 143-44, n.38.
28 See CoMm. ON ETHICS, Am. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, ACOG
ComM. Op. 385, THE LIMITS OF CONSCIENTIOUS REFUSAL IN REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE 5
(2007) [hereinafter ETHICS OPINION], available at http://www.acog.org/from-home/
publications/ethics/co385.pdf (suggesting a physician's obligation to provide abor-
tions to avoid harm to even "a patient's conception of well-being"). The 2011 Bulletin
for the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology states that board certification
can be revoked for "violation of ABOG or ACOG rules and/or ethical principles." See
Am. BD. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, 2011 BULLETIN FOR BASIC CERTIFICATION IN
OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 7 (2010), available at http://www.abog.org/bulletins/
basic.bulletin.201 1.pdf.
29 See, e.g., Rob Stein, New Health-Care Law Raises Concern About Respecting Providers'
Consciences, WASH. POST, May 11, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/10/AR2010051003235.html (describing case of
Catherina Cenzon-DeCarlo, a nurse forced by Mt. Sinai hospital in New York to assist
in the abortion of a 22-week fetus thought to have Down Syndrome).
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that follow, shows that the Fourteenth Amendment does indeed pro-
tect this right.
Part I sets forth the historical test used by the Supreme Court to
determine which rights merit substantive protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Generally speaking, the Court's cases show that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects "fundamental rights and liber-
ties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
traditions,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that
'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."'3 0 Part
I also explains that the Court gives special emphasis to recent history,
is careful to protect citizens from psychological harms that might flow
from denial of rights, and views the ability to form one's own beliefs
about certain issues as itself protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
With this test in mind, Part II provides a historical overview of a
healthcare provider's ability to choose not to participate in abortions.
This historical review shows that healthcare providers have generally
been free to refuse to participate in abortions. The reasons for this
long tradition have varied over time and include that, at various times,
abortion was illegal, was expressly prohibited by established principles
of medical ethics, and/or was the subject of express statutory con-
science protections.3'
Part III then analyzes whether this history shows that the right of
healthcare providers to refuse to participate in abortions is, in fact,
sufficiently rooted in the nation's history and traditions to fall within
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive protections. In light of the
long history of legal and ethical prohibitions on abortion in many
contexts until the 1970s, and the repeated, nearly unanimous, and
nearly universal legislative actions to protect objectors after Roe, this
Part concludes that a right to refuse to participate in abortions satis-
fies the Court's traditional analysis for protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Perhaps most surprisingly, this analysis also shows that the right
not to participate in an abortion procedure is not merely required by
Roe and Casey-it actually better satisfies the required Fourteenth
Amendment test than the abortion right itself. If the ability to pro-
cure an abortion-which was illegal, discouraged, and/or widely
30 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted); see
also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (finding those rights "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" to be protected against state infringement by the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934) (recognizing rights protected by Due Process that are "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental").
31 See infra Part II.
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regarded as unethical for much of our pre-Roe history-passes the
Fourteenth Amendment's historical inquiry, the conscience right eas-
ily clears the hurdle.3 2
This historical analysis is bolstered by the fact that a refusal right
fits squarely within the zone of individual decision making about abor-
tion protected by the Court's decisions in Casey and Lawrence v.
Texas.33 In particular, the Court in Casey emphasized that the Four-
teenth Amendment protects the ability to make one's own decisions
about abortion without government interference, because making
one's own decisions about such matters "define [s] the attributes of
personhood."34 Furthermore, recognition of a right to refuse protects
healthcare providers from the types of psychological harm that the
Court recognized as justifying protection for the abortion right in Roe
and Casey. For these reasons, a proper application of Roe, Casey, and
the Court's substantive due process analysis requires recognition of
the rights of healthcare providers to decide for themselves whether or
not to participate in abortions.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE TEST-DETERMINING WHICH SUBSTANTIVE
RIGHTS ARE PROTECTED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
It is not difficult for courts and scholars to agree that there is a
constitutional right to free speech, to the free exercise of religion, or
to trial byjury. Each of these rights is expressly included in the text of
the Constitution.35 No great effort is required to identify them; no
one writes law review articles to prove their existence.
The task of identifying and enumerating substantive rights pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment is more difficult. The word
32 See infra Part III.
33 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State."); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S.
at 851) (same).
34 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (noting that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects a pregnant woman's right to shape her own destiny
based "on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society").
35 See U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech . . . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.. . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. VII
("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . ).
[VOL. 87:110
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"conscience" does not appear in the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor, of
course, do the words "abortion," "sex," or "refusal of lifesaving food
and hydration." From one perspective, the absence of these words is
tantamount to proof that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
left these issues to be addressed by our political process, and not by
constitutional mandates.36 Regardless of the merits of this view, it is
not currently the law: the Court has found numerous substantive con-
stitutional rights to be within the liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.37
Analyzing whether the right of a healthcare provider to refuse to
participate in abortions fits within this liberty interest requires an
understanding of both the standards articulated by the Court for rec-
ognizing such rights, and how those standards have been applied in a
variety of cases.
A. The "Deeply Rooted" Standard As Articulated By the Court
The Court has acknowledged the inherent dangers of recogniz-
ing constitutional rights that are not anchored to express words in the
constitutional text, noting that "guideposts for responsible decision
making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended."38 For
this reason, the Court has said it must "exercise the utmost care when-
ever we are asked to break new ground in this field, lest the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the
policy preferences of the Members of this Court."39
36 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 935-36 (1973) ("What is frightening about Roe is that this super-pro-
tected right is not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers' think-
ing respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the
provisions they included, or the nation's governmental structure."); see generally, Jack
M. Balkin, Framework Oiginalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 549,
560 (2009) ("[W]hen the terms of the Constitution are vague or silent on a question
. . . we must develop doctrines or pass laws to make its words concrete or fill in
gaps.").
37 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (finding a right to engage in private consen-
sual homosexual sex); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) (finding a constitutional
right to abortion); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (finding a right to
interstate travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding a right to marry);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding a right "to engage in any of the
common occupations of life").
38 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. Harker
Heiths, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
39 Id. (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)) (internal
citation omitted).
2011] 11
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
In light of these dangers, the Court has stated that the Four-
teenth Amendment's "Due Process Clause specially protects those fun-
damental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty norjustice would exist if they
were sacrificed." 4 0 The Court has noted that the "outlines" of the lib-
erty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, while "perhaps
not capable of being fully clarified-have at least been carefully
refined by concrete examples involving fundamental rights found to
be deeply rooted in our legal tradition."41 Requiring this historical
foundation "tends to rein in the subjective elements that are necessa-
rily present in due process judicial review" and "avoids the need for
complex balancing of competing interests in every case." 42 For similar
reasons, the Court has also "required in substantive-due-process cases
a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest."43
B. The 'Deeply Rooted" Standard in Application
Even with these tests in place, however, it is of course possible for
reasonable minds to differ about how exactly to determine which
rights satisfy the historical inquiry.44 Accordingly, it is necessary to
40 Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 and Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 326 (1937)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For an argu-
ment that this approach has been abandoned by the Court, see Laurence H. Tribe,
Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L.
REV. 1893, 1936 (2004) (arguing that "Lawrence's focus on the role of self-regulating
relationships in American liberty suggests that the ... due process 'name that liberty'
game arguably validated by Glucksber' is replaced by a "focus on the underlying pat-
tern of self-government ... defined by the rights enumerated or implicit in the Con-
stitution or recognized by the landmark decisions construing it").
41 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722. But see Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive
Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 90 (2006) ("Notwithstanding the Court's bold asser-
tions in Glucksberg, the theory of historical tradition was not then and is not now the
Court's 'established approach' to substantive due process.").
42 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
43 Id. at 721. This is, of course, a crucial step in the process. See Laurence H.
Tribe & Michael C. Dorff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1057, 1087 (1990) ("What is novel aboutJustice Scalia's argument [in support of
a tradition-based approach] is the implicit suggestion that historical traditions come
equipped with something like instruction manuals explaining how abstractly the
Court should describe them.").
44 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion) (describing that the identification of the relevant tradition pertaining to the
asserted right must be made at the most specific level possible); Michael W. McCon-
nell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 671
(1997) (arguing that specificity is required because "[aliry generalities . . . are too
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consider this standard as it has been applied by the Court in a variety
of circumstances. Four principal lessons emerge.
1. The Historical Analysis Requires Only De Facto Freedom to
Engage in the Activity
First and foremost, a review of the Court's substantive due pro-
cess cases shows that much of the analysis is, as the test suggests, his-
torical. Thus Roe v. Wade, for example, includes a long historical
review of abortion laws in England, the United States, and even
ancient cultures.45 Likewise, Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Public
Health46-in which the Court recognized a constitutional right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment-also includes a review of the his-
torical ability of patients to refuse treatment. The Court's decisions in
Lawrence v. Texas47 (right to engage in private homosexual conduct)
and Washington v. Glucksberg, 8 (no right to physician-assisted suicide)
do the same.49
Interestingly, in order to qualify as a "fundamental" right "deeply
rooted" in the nation's traditions, the Court does not require a histori-
cal showing that the right was previously considered constitutional.
Nor does it require that the right have been protected by prior stat-
utes or at common law. The Court does not even require that the
actions at issue were legal. Rather, the Court simply appears to be
looking at whether, as a practical matter, individuals could, or could
not, engage in the activity at issue.50 Put differently, the historical
imprecise to support legal analysis); John Safranek & Stephen Safranek, Finding Rights
Specifically, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 945 (2007) (arguing that Tribe and Dorff's criticisms
of Scalia's opinions undermine their own theories, too); Tribe & Dorff, supra note 43
(arguing that Justice Scalia's approach requires a too specific description of the
right).
45 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-47 (1973).
46 Cnizan v. Mo. Dep't of Pub. Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990) (recognizing
a constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and assuming the right
extends to refusal of lifesaving food and hydration).
47 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (finding a right to engage in pri-
vate homosexual conduct).
48 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (rejecting an asserted right to physician-assisted
suicide).
49 But see Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process Afler Gonzales v. Carhart, 106
MICH. L. REv. 1517 (2008) (arguing that Lawrence and Glucksberg used different
approaches, and that the Gonzales court implicitly adopted the Glucksberg approach);
Tribe, supra note 40, 1921-25 (describing Glucksberg as employing a different
approach than Lawrence).
50 As Professor Michael McConnell explains, it was not necessary for the right to
be protected when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, "but only that it has
enjoyed protection over the course of years." McConnell, supra note 44, at 671.
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analysis appears to be satisfied by a showing of only defacto freedom,
even if that freedom historically had not been dejure, or officially rec-
ognized by the law.
For certain rights, the historical analysis is relatively simple. For
example, the Court had no difficulty in Cruzan finding that individu-
als have long held the right to decide for themselves whether to
receive particular medical treatments because the right had long been
protected through causes of action for battery and for lack of
informed consent. 51
But the Court's cases suggest that the historical inquiry can be
satisfied even without this type of long-standing legal protection.
Thus, despite the absence of any laws affirmatively protecting abor-
tion, despite undisputed prohibitions on abortion for most of the cen-
tury prior to Roe, and despite common law indications that at least
some abortions were illegal, the Court in Roe found the historical anal-
ysis satisfied because it determined women enjoyed "substantially
broader" freedom to abort at earlier times:
It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adop-
tion of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the
19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under
most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way,
a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a preg-
nancy than she does in most States today. At least with respect to
the early stage of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limita-
tion, the opportunity to make this choice was present in this country
well into the 19th century. Even later, the law continued for some
time to treat less punitively an abortion procured in early
pregnancy. 52
Likewise, in Lawrence, the Court again found an activity that had
been widely criminalized to be a fundamental and deeply rooted
right. The Court acknowledged that sodomy had long been illegal,
but found sodomy laws had not generally targeted homosexual sod-
omy.53 Furthermore, the Court found that the prosecutions in the
historical record for consensual homosexual sodomy were sparse,
making it "difficult to say that society approved of a rigorous and sys-
tematic punishment of consensual acts committed in private and by
adults. 54
Thus the Court's analysis shows that activities which were never
expressly protected, and at times were expressly outlawed, can be rec-
51 See Cruzan, 479 U.S. at 269.
52 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140-41 (1973).
53 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (1997).
54 Id. at 569-70.
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ognized as fundamental rights "deeply rooted" in the nation's history
and traditions. The test is satisfied if the historical analysis shows that,
as a practical matter, individuals remained free to engage in the activ-
ity seeking constitutional protection.
2. Recent History Has Particular Importance
The Court's opinions also demonstrate that the historical analysis
places a particular emphasis on recent history. In Roe, for example, the
Court emphasized the recent trends toward liberalization of attitudes
about abortion among the medical and legal communities.5 5 The
Court ultimately aligned itself with these recent trends, despite the
clear laws prohibiting abortion for much of the prior 150 years.56
Likewise, in Glucksberg, the Court emphasized recent history, noting
that all but one state that recently revisited its suicide laws had
retained the ban against assisted suicide.57
In Lawrence, the Court emphasized the greater importance of
recent history, saying " [i] n all events we think that our laws and tradi-
tions in the past half century are of most relevance" to the historical
inquiry.5 8 The Court noted that relatively few states had recently been
specifically targeting homosexual sodomy for prosecution, and that
many states had been moving toward abolishing their bans targeting
homosexuals.59 These more recent legal developments "show [ed] an
emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters per-
taining to sex."60
Thus while the test's language focuses on the nation's "history
and traditions," the Court appears to emphasize recent developments
and what they indicate about the scope of liberty that should be pro-
tected by due process. 6'
55 Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (explaining that because "throughout the major portion of
the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are
today," the Court would not find the unborn to be persons under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
56 See id. at 139-41 (noting widespread laws banning abortion at the time the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified).
57 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).
58 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72.
59 See id. at 559 ("American laws targeting same-sex couples did not develop until
the last third of the 20th century. Even now, only nine States have singled out same-
sex relations for criminal prosecution.").
60 Id. at 572.
61 See also Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.").
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3. The Court Considers the Burden Imposed by Denial of the
Right, Including Psychological Burdens
Third, although not expressly mentioned as a separate part of the
test, the Court analyzes the burdens imposed by denial of the asserted
right. Thus in Roe, the Court emphasized the range of harms faced by
a woman forced to continue her pregnancy. Notably, the Court
focused not only on the physical burdens, but focused especially on
mental and psychological burdens in determining whether to protect
abortion, including "a distressful life and future" in which "mental
and physical health may be taxed by child care," "the distress . . . asso-
ciated with the unwanted child," and the "continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood."62
Likewise, in Casey, the Court emphasized the burdens it thought
would be imposed upon women if it overruled Roe as one of the fac-
tors counseling against reversal. The Court explained that "for two
decades of economic and social developments, people have organized
intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of
themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of
abortion in the event that contraception should fail."63 Therefore,
the Court could not ignore the "certain cost of overruling Roe for peo-
ple who have ordered their thinking and living around that case." 6 4
Casey elsewhere explained that abortion is "fraught with conse-
quences" and that a woman who chose abortion with incomplete
information may later suffer "devastating psychological conse-
quences." 65 Thus, as in Roe, Casey demonstrates that the Court's sub-
stantive due process decisions include some focus on the burdens they
would impose by not recognizing a right, and expressly recognize the
importance of avoiding government-imposed psychological burdens,
particularly related to abortion.
62 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
63 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1994).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 882. Interestingly, the Court also seemed particularly concerned with
the psychological impact of reversing Roe upon the faith of the citizenry in the
Supreme Court. Thus the Casey plurality noted that a decision to overrule a prior
precedent must "rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior
case was wrongly decided," and that a "decision to overrule Roe's essential holding
under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of
both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy" in the eyes of the
public. Id. at 864, 869.
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4. The Fourteenth Amendment Protects the Right to Make One's
Own Decisions Without "Compulsion of the State"
Finally, the Court's decisions emphasize the importance of per-
mitting the individual to make personal decisions about issues such as
procreation without government compulsion. Thus both Casey and
Lawrence indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment protects rights
not only for their importance when actually exercised, but also
because the act of making one's own decisions about such matter is
itself part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human Afe. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.66
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment's protections extend not only
to actions, but also to the right to make one's own decisions without
"compulsion of the State." The Court determined that freely making
such decisions about certain issues-namely those implicating one's
"right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life"-"define [s] the attributes
of personhood" and is therefore within the liberty interest protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Accordingly, the Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the pregnant woman's
destiny "must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society."6 8
II. HisToRuCAL ANALYSIs: WERE HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS
HISTORICALLY FREE TO CHOOSE NOT TO
PARTICIPATE IN ABORTIONS?
With the Court's "deeply rooted" standard in mind, this Part will
explore whether healthcare providers were required to participate in
abortions in three different time periods: early English and American
common law until the early 1800s (when the first American statutory
abortion law was enacted); the early 1800s until Roe v. Wade in 1973;
and the post-Roe era. As set forth below, this history suggests that
66 Id. at 851 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 852.
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healthcare providers were generally free from government compul-
sion to participate in abortions.
A. Healthcare Providers and Abortion in English Common Law
and Early American Law
1. Legal Restrictions on Abortion
The Court began its constitutional analysis in Roe with a historical
survey of legal and ethical restrictions related to abortion. 69 After
reviewing the regulation of abortion in ancient cultures70 and discuss-
ing the impact of the Hippocratic Oath,71 the Court provided a
detailed overview of the common law related to abortion. The Court
found that abortions performed before "quickening-the first recog-
nizable movement of the fetus in utero"-were not indictable at com-
mon law.72 The Court attributed the legal reliance on quickening to
"a confluence of earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and
69 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-52 (1973) (surveying history of abortion regu-
lation from ancient times to the present).
70 The Court explained that regulation of abortion in ancient cultures varied-
abortions were punished in the Persian Empire, practiced in the Greek Empire, and
"resorted to without scruple" in the Roman Empire. Id. at 130 (quoting LUDWIG EDEL-
STEIN, THE HIPPocRATIc OATH 10 (1943)). Where abortion was prosecuted in the
ancient world, "it seems to have been based on a concept of a violation of the father's
right to his offspring." Id.
71 The Court explained that the various translations of the Hippocratic Oath pro-
hibited abortion. See id. at 131-32. The Court observed that the Oath "has stood so
long as the ethical guide of the medical profession" and that Hippocrates has been
described as the "Father of Medicine." Id. at 130-31. After noting a theory that the
Oath's prohibition on abortion was not widely accepted even in its own times, the
Court explained that the Oath became popular at the end of antiquity. See id. at
130-32. At that point, "[r]esistance against suicide and against abortion became com-
mon" and the "emerging teachings of Christianity were in agreement." Id. at 132.
For these reasons, the Oath-with its absolute prohibition on abortions-"'became
the nucleus of all medical ethics' and 'was applauded as the embodiment of truth.'"
Id. (quoting EDELSTEIN, supra note 70, at 64).
72 Id. Historian James C. Mohr provides a typical exposition on the legal impor-
tance of quickening in this era in his book Abortion in America:
The common law did not formally recognize the existence of a fetus in crim-
inal cases until after it had quickened. After quickening, the expulsion and
destruction of a fetus without due cause was considered a crime, because the
fetus itself had manifested some semblance of a separate existence: the abil-
ity to move. ... Practically, because no reliable tests for pregnancy existed in
the early nineteenth century, quickening alone could confirm with absolute
certainty that a woman really was pregnant. Prior to quickening, each of the
telltale signs of pregnancy could, at least in theory, be explained in alterna-
tive ways by physicians of the day... . The upshot was that American women
in 1800 were legally free to attempt to terminate a condition that might turn
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canon law concepts of when life begins," principally focused on when
the fetus was thought to be "formed" or "when a 'person' came into
being, that is infused with a 'soul' or 'animated."' 7 "Due to the con-
tinued uncertainty" and "lack of any empirical basis" as to when these
events occurred, the Court found that the common law focused on
quickening as the critical point.7 4
The Court further explained that there was some debate over
whether abortion of a "quick" fetus was a felony or a lesser crime.75
Thirteenth century authority appears to have deemed abortion a
homicide, though later common law scholars viewed it as a lesser
offense.76 Edward Coke, for example, took the position that such an
abortion was "a great misprision, and no murder."77 Blackstone
reports that abortion had once been considered manslaughter, but
that then-modern law took a less severe view.78 Relying on studies that
suggest that Coke may have deliberately misstated the law because of
his opposition to abortion, the Court expressed doubt that abortion
"was ever firmly established as a common law crime."79
Based on this history, the Court found that women had a "sub-
stantially broader" freedom to obtain an abortion at common law than
existed at the time of Roe. The Court does not claim, however, that
this broader historical freedom included the ability to have the gov-
ernment force healthcare providers to participate in abortions.80
Historian James Mohr provides a similar account of the common
law related to abortion. Mohr reports that information on abortion
and abortifacients was available "from midwives and midwifery texts"81
and from " [h] erbal healers . . . and . . other irregular practitioners"
out to have been a pregnancy until the existence of that pregnancy was
incontrovertibly confirmed by the perception of fetal movement.
JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA 3-4 (1978).
73 Roe, 410 U.S. at 133.
74 Id. at 134.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 135 (citation omitted).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 135-36 & n.26.
80 Indeed the Court's decision just four years later in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977)-in which the Court emphasized that the abortion right in Roe does not
require government funding of abortion-suggests that the Court viewed the histori-
cal right recognized in Roe to be a right to be free from governmental interference,
rather than an affirmative right to compel governments or individuals to provide ser-
vices; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 ("The Hyde Amendment, like the
Connecticut welfare regulation at issue in Maher, places no governmental obstacle in
the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy ....
81 See MOHR, supra, note 72, at 11.
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of the day.82 Mohr argues that the "regular physicians" of the day
"clearly possessed" the knowledge and skills to end pregnancy and
that he had "little reason to doubt" that they "sometimes" used their
skills to do so. 83 Indeed, Mohr suggests that these physicians could
have felt business pressures from their patients to perform abortions
prior to quickening-i.e., when pregnancy "was impossible to diag-
nose"-for fear of losing their patients to competitors.84
Despite suggesting that physicians may have felt business-related
pressure from patients to perform pre-quickening abortions, Mohr
reports that there were no laws at the time which governed abortion at
all, noting that "[i] n 1800 no jurisdiction in the United States had
enacted any statutes whatsoever on the subject of abortion."85 Mohr's
discussion of post-1800 laws focuses entirely on laws designed to
restrict or prohibit abortion, not promote it. Thus Mohr's account,
like the account in Roe, supports the notion that healthcare providers
were not compelled by the government to provide abortions at com-
mon law.86
Much of the history recited in Roe is derived from the work of
Cyril C. Means, Jr.8 7 Means argued that abortion was not criminal at
all in England or America prior to the nineteenth century-not even
after quickening-and that abortion laws were enacted in the nine-
teenth century to protect the health of the mother, and not out of
concern for the life of the fetus.88 From this premise, Means argued
for an abortion right based either on the common law or the Ninth
Amendment.89
Yet Means's history also contains no suggestion that healthcare
providers could be forced by the government to provide abortions.
To the contrary, Means explains that the common law merely "toler-
82 Id.
83 Id. at 14.
84 Id. at 14-15.
85 Id. at vii.
86 Mohr also points out that in this early period abortion "was not thought to be a
means of family limitation." Id. at 17. Instead, "an overwhelming percentage of the
American women who sought and succeeded in having abortions did so because they
feared the social consequences of an illegitimate pregnancy." Id. at 16-17. In light of
this societal disapproval of sex outside of marriage, it seems unlikely that the govern-
ment would have been simultaneously compelling physicians to provide these women
with abortions, or that such compulsion would not appear in the public record.
87 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132-35 (1973).
88 Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-
Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-
Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971).
89 See generally id.
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ated" abortions, but did not legalize them. As a result, doctors who
chose to perform abortions did so at great risk to themselves, because
if the woman did not survive the abortion, "he who had performed it
was hanged."90 As Means explains, even if abortion was "tolerated" at
common law, this strong governmental response to error provided a
powerful disincentive for physicians to perform abortions:
Thus the abortionist was, in law, made an insurer of the success of
the procedure, on the penalty of his life, at a time when every abor-
tion was a serious gamble. This being so, few physicians, at common
law, could have ever performed anything but therapeutic abortions.
Thus, the abortion-seeking woman had two problems. Firstly, to
find someone willing to perform the abortion who was as well quali-
fied as possible; and, secondly, to survive the procedure.9'
This legal regime, with its severe treatment of abortion providers,
strongly suggests that the government was not simultaneously forcing
doctors to perform abortions against their will.
Furthermore, although Means made his arguments almost
entirely based on the common law, he apparently saw no inconsis-
tency with Roe-era laws that included conscience protections for
unwilling healthcare providers. For example, while discussing one of
the liberalization laws considered in New York, Means explained that
it "quite properly provides a 'conscience' clause enabling any doctor
or hospital employee to opt out of participating in abortions.' 92
Ultimately, the Roe/Mohr/Means version of abortion history-
which was echoed in a historians' brief filed with the Supreme Court
in Casey"3-suggests the following about whether physicians could his-
torically be compelled to provide abortions. First and foremost, there
is no indication in these histories that healthcare providers ever were,
or ever could be, forced by the government to provide abortions.
Such evidence, if it existed, would have powerfully supported the cen-
90 Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the
Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 437 (1968)
(emphasis added).
91 Id. at 437-38.
92 Id. at 434 n.54 (citing proposed legislation which would have included the
language: "(b) No hospital employee or member of a hospital medical staff shall be
required to participate in a procedure authorized by this title who shall inform the
hospital of his or her election not to participate hereunder. (c) No physician shall be
required to give advice with respect to, or participate in, any procedure authorized by
this title who shall inform a patient that the failure or refusal to do so is based on his
or her election not to give such advice or to participate in any such procedure.").
93 See Brief of 250 American Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 12006403.
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tral arguments of these writers. Second, abortion was illegal after
quickening, thus confirming that physicians were not likely to be
forced by the government to perform post-quickening abortions, and
therefore not likely to be forced to perform abortions once pregnancy
was firmly established. Third, as to pre-quickening abortions-i.e.,
abortions during the stage of pregnancy at which it was not yet prova-
ble that a woman was actually pregnant-many of them were per-
formed with essentially home remedies, or by midwives or "irregular
practitioners."94 While "regular practitioners" may have at times pro-
vided what turned out to be abortions during this stage, there is no
evidence to suggest that they were compelled to do so by the govern-
ment. Fourth, even if abortion was tolerated during this period, it was
not expressly legalized, and there were severe government-imposed
disincentives for physicians to provide them.
The Roe/Mohr/Means historical treatment of abortion is not
accepted by all scholars. Some critics argue that the Court misread
both the English and early American common law treatment of abor-
tion, and that abortion had actually been a crime for centuries.9 5 For
example, in his 2004 book Dispelling the Myths of Abortion History,
Joseph Dellapenna argues that "Anglo-American law has always
treated abortion as a serious crime, generally even including early in
pregnancy, presenting evidence of prosecutions and even executions,
occurring as long as 800 years ago in England, and less serious punish-
ments in colonial America."96 If Roe's critics are correct about this
94 Id. at *14.
95 See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, Blackstone's Ninth Amendment: A Historical Common
Law Baseline for the Interpretation of Unenumerated Rights, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 167, 218
(2010) ("Although Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe attempted to infuse
some doubt into the status of the common law crime of abortion, stating at one point
that research 'makes it now appear doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established
as a common-law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus,' his
opinion was based on faulty history and was quickly debunked by scholars." (quoting
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 136 (1973))); John Keown, Back to the Future of Abortion
Law: Roe's Rejection of America's History and Traditions, 22 ISSUEs L. & MED. 3 (2006)
(concluding that abortion was, in fact, a crime at common law); Paul Benjamin Lin-
ton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight From Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 15, 106 (1993) ("These decisions, together with the dozens of
abortion prosecutions reported in the digests, lay to rest the doubt expressed in Roe
that 'abortion was ever firmly established as a common-law crime even with respect to
the destruction of a quick fetus.'"); Lynn D. Wardle, "Time Enough": Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services and the Prudent Pace ofJustice, 41 FLA. L. REv. 881, 928 (1989)
(noting that Roe's suggestion that abortion was not established as a common law
crime has been thoroughly discredited).
96 JOSEPH DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY xii (2004).
Dellapenna quotes several early commentators on the common law to suggest that
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history-a question that is beyond the scope of this article-then
abortion was a serious crime at both English and colonial American
common law. Under this historical view, providers were compelled by
the government not to provide abortions (and therefore obviously
'free' to follow the law and not provide them).
2. The Common Law Right to Refuse Patients
The apparent historical freedom of healthcare providers to
choose not to participate in abortions is consistent with the more gen-
eral ability to choose whether or not to accept a particular patient for
treatment. At common law, healthcare providers (including both
physicians and pharmacists) were free to decide whether or not to
accept a patient.97
Interestingly, this common law freedom to refuse to provide med-
ical services even extended to situations of medical emergency, in
which a patient needed services to save his or her life or avoid serious
bodily harm. As a general matter, the common law did not require
one to help another person in an emergency. In 1965, the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts described the common law on this point as
creating
a series of older decisions to the effect that one human being, see-
ing a fellow man in dire peril, is under no legal obligation to aid
him, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigar, and watch the other
drown. Such decisions have been condemned by legal writers as
revolting to any moral sense, but thus far they remain the law.98
abortion has been a criminal act since the inception of the common law. For
instance, around 1250, Bracton wrote "[i]f one strikes a pregnant woman or gives her
a potion in order to procure an abortion, if the foetus is already formed or animated,
especially if it is animated, he commits homicide." Id. at 132. Dellapenna argues that
"[a]ny supposed 'common law liberty of abortion' is as mythical on this side of the
Atlantic as it is on the other side," citing as examples two cases in which men were
charged with murder for inducing pre-quickening abortions in Maryland. Id. at 220.
97 See, e.g., SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CoNTRACTs § 62:12 (4th ed. 2002)
("In the absence of a statute, a physician is under no obligation to engage in practice
or to accept professional employment." (citing cases)). This principle has generally
continued in effect. See, e.g., Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (Va. 1977) ("In
the absence of a statute, a physician has no legal obligation to accept as a patient
everyone who seeks his services."); Oliver v. Brock, 342 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. 1976) (citing
61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 96). The same common law
rule applies to pharmacists. See, e.g., 28 C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics § 100 ("A druggist
[absent statute] is not obliged to fill any and all prescriptions, but may refuse to fill
one for good reason.").
98 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965).
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This harsh common law rule also applied to healthcare providers.
Thus, for example, in 1901, the Supreme Court of Indiana rejected
the notion that a physician had a common law duty to treat all
patients who sought his or her services, even in an emergency, even
when the physician has an ongoing relationship with the patient as a
family physician, and even when the physician had no particularly
good reason not to help. The court explained that because the physi-
cian had no duty to "render professional service to everyone who
applied" and that acceptance of a license did not obligate the physi-
cian to "practice at all or on other terms than he may choose to
accept," the physician had no duty to treat the patient.99
3. Emerging Codes of Medical Ethics
In addition to the evidence from the historical accounts concern-
ing abortion and the general historical freedom of healthcare profes-
sionals to refuse patients, emerging codes of medical ethics at the end
of the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century further support the
notion that physicians likely were not compelled to provide abortions.
For example, the Court in Roe explained that the Hippocratic
Oath which "has stood so long as the ethical guide of the medical
profession" prohibited doctors from providing abortions. 00 The
99 Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901) ("At and for years before
decedent's death appellee was a practicing physician at Mace, in Montgomery county,
duly licensed under the laws of the state. He held himself out to the public as a
general practitioner of medicine. He had been decedent's family physician. Dece-
dent became dangerously ill, and sent for appellee. The messenger informed appel-
lee of decedent's violent sickness, tendered him his fee for his services, and stated to
him that no other physician was procurable in time, and that decedent relied on him
for attention. No other physician was procurable in time to be of any use, and dece-
dent did rely on appellee for medical assistance. Without any reason whatever, appel-
lee refused to render aid to decedent. No other patients were requiring appellee's
immediate service, and he could have gone to the relief of decedent if he had been
willing to do so. Death ensued, without decedent's fault, and wholly from appellee's
wrongful act. The alleged wrongful act was appellee's refusal to enter into a contract
of employment. Counsel do not contend that, before the enactment of the law regu-
lating the practice of medicine, physicians were bound to render professional service
to every one who applied. The act [regulating medical practice] is a preventive, not a
compulsive, measure. In obtaining the state's license (permission) to practice
medicine, the state does not require, and the licensee does not engage, that he will
practice at all or on other terms than he may choose to accept." (internal citation
omitted)); see also, Findlay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 230 P.2d 526, 531 (Ariz. 1951) ("Phy-
sicians are not public servants who are bound to serve all who seek them, as are inn-
keepers, common carriers, and the like." (quoting 41 AM. JUR. Physicians and Surgeons
§ 4)).
100 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973).
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Court explained that after antiquity, the abortion-prohibiting Oath
"became the nucleus of all medical ethics and was applauded as the
embodiment of truth."' 0 It seems highly unlikely that governments
had the power to compel doctors to violate the Oath's prohibition on
abortions.
Similarly, the first modern written code of medical ethics, which
appeared at the end of the eighteenth century, likewise prohibited
abortion. In 1794, British physician Thomas Percival published his
MedicalJurisprudence or a Code ofEthics and Institutes Adopted to the Profes-
sions of Physic and Surgery.10 2 Percival's Medical Jurisprudence was the
first code of medical ethics of its kind, either in England or the
United States. 0 3 The code was revised and circulated more broadly
under the title Medical Ethics in 1803.104 Percival wrote the following:
"To extinguish the first spark of life is a crime of the same nature,
both against our Maker and society, as to destroy an infant, a child, or
a man." 0 5 Percival's Medical Ethics was well received in the United
States, and would later become the basis for the American Medical
Association's initial code of medical ethics. 0 6
B. Healthcare Providers and Abortion Law From
the Early 1800s Until Roe
Whatever disputes exist between the competing histories of abor-
tion at common law, they give way to broad agreements about the
state of abortion law beginning in the early 1800s. Historians on all
sides agree that during the nineteenth century, most American juris-
dictions enacted express statutory abortion bans.
In 1821, Connecticut passed the nation's first criminal abortion
statute, which banned the use of poisons to conduct abortions. By
1828, Missouri, Illinois, and New York had all followed suit. By 1868-
the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted-thirty-six state
and territorial legislatures had enacted laws restricting abortion. 0 7
101 Id. at 132.
102 See THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ETHICS REVOLUTION, at xiii, xv (Baker et al. eds.,
1999). The American Medical Association relied heavily on Percival's code for its own
initial code of medical ethics in 1847, and later called Percival's "the most significant
contribution to Western medical ethical history subsequent to Hippocrates." See
AIBERT R.JONSEN, A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2000).
103 Robert Baker, Codes ofEthics: Some History, 19 PERSPECTrviS ON THE PROFESSIONS
3 (1999).
104 See id. at 4.
105 FREDERICK N. DYER, THE PHYSICIANS' CRUSADE AGAINST ABORTION 10 (2005).
106 See id.
107 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 175 & n.1 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Although these laws varied as to whether they applied before quicken-
ing and the severity of the punishment, they were part of an overall
legislative push that meant most abortions were banned by statute by
the end of the century. 0 8 The quickening distinction gradually disap-
peared entirely in the middle and late nineteenth century. 0 9
Most of the earliest bans on abortion were bans on chemical
abortions, and thus would have barred pharmacists or apothecaries
from providing drugs designed to induce abortion. For example,
England's first abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act of 1803,
criminalized the conduct of
any person or persons .. . [who] willfully and maliciously administer
to, or cause to be administered to, or taken by any woman, any
medicines, drug, or other substance or thing whatsoever, or shall
use or employ, or cause or procure to be used or employed any
instrument or other means whatsoever, with intent thereby to cause
or procure the miscarriage.""
The Act went on to make clear that even providing such medicines
was punishable:
their counselors, aiders, and abettors, knowing of and privy to such
offence, shall be and are hereby declared to be guilty of felony, and
shall be liable to be fined, imprisoned, set in and upon the pillory,
publickly or privately whipped ... or to be transported beyond the
seas for any term not exceeding fourteen years, at the discretion of
the court before which such offender shall be tried and
convicted.' I
American law was in accord." 2
These legislative developments occurred against a backdrop in
which medical authorities, the popular press, and religious leaders
publicly and unequivocally denounced abortion. For example, an
1803 medical treatise declared abortion "a most unnatural crime" that
108 See id. at 117-18 nn.1-2 (RehnquistJ. dissenting).
109 See id. at 139.
110 Malicious Shooting or Stabbing Act, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, § 2 (Eng.); see also,
Suzanne M. Alford, Note, Is Self-Abortion a Fundamental Right?, 52 DuKE L.J. 1011, 1020
(2003) (noting a 1602 English case, Regina v. Webb, in which a woman was indicted for
self-aborting with the use of poison).
111 Alford, supra note 110, at 1020 n.57.
112 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT., § 20-14 (1821) (making it a crime to cause abortion
by giving a pregnant woman a "poisonous substance"); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 138
(describing the Connecticut statute as having adopted part of Lord Ellenborough's
Act). According to Mohr, this first abortion ban was "aimed primarily at apothecaries
and physicians." MOHR, supra note 72, at 22.
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could not "be viewed without horror."' 13 Medical societies of the day
likewise opposed abortion.' 1 4 In 1859, the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA) unanimously approved a report deeming abortion the
"unwarrantable destruction of human life."115 The AMA criticized
doubts regarding "the actual and independent existence of the child
before birth, as a living being" as "based, and only based, upon mis-
taken and exploded medical dogmas."" 6 The AMA resolved that it
should be "unlawful and unprofessional" for any physician to take part
in an abortion. 1 7 The report closed with resolutions for medical
schools to teach students to oppose abortion and for the members to
"repudiate and denounce the conduct of abortionists" and "hold no
intercourse with them either professionally or otherwise."' "8 Moreo-
ver, as the Court reported in Roe, the Hippocratic Oath prohibited
abortions and was accepted as "the nucleus of all medical ethics.""'
Physicians at the time frequently referred to the Oath when condemn-
ing abortion.120
As the medical profession continued their opposition to abor-
tion, both the press and organized religion also publicly criticized the
practice.' 2 ' For example, The New York Times condemned abortion in
113 WILLIAM BUCHAN, DOMESTIC MEDICINE 361 (1803).
114 For example, in 1854, the Massachusetts Medical Society expelled a doctor for
"culpably procuring an abortion." JosErH KErr, THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL PROFISSION: THi ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS, 1780-1860, 25 (1968). Three years
later, the Society was petitioned by local members to declare abortion "wicked" and
lobby the state legislature to oppose it. See Medical, N.Y. TIMEs,June 27, 1857, at 8. In
1860, the New York Medical Society called for more stringent legislation against abor-
tion. See New York Medical Society, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1860, at 5. A few years later, the
Society's president, in his inaugural address, called on the state legislature to elimi-
nate the quickening requirement from anti-abortion statutes and for members to safe-
guard the public from abortifacients. State Medical Society, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1868, at
5.
115 Am. Med. Ass'n, Minutes of the Annual Meeting 1859, 12 Transactions of Am.
Med. Ass'n 27 (1859).
116 Id.
117 Id. A report by the AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion called abortion
providers "modern Herods" and 'judas-like." SeeW.L. Atlee & D.A. O'Donnell, Report
of the Committee on Criminal Abortion, 22 TRANSACTIONS OF AM. MED. Ass'N, 239, 251
(1871). The committee called for abortionists to be "marked as Cain was marked"
and "be made outcasts of society." Id. at 256.
118 Atlee & O'Donnell, supra note 117, at 258.
119 Id.
120 DYER, supra note 105, at 12.
121 See generally MARVIN OLASKY, THE PRESS AND ABORTION 1833-1988 (1988); see
also From Buffalo. The Case of Dr. Bigler, The Alleged Abortionist-Receipts of Flour and
Grain, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1856, at 1; General News, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1862, at 4;
Local Intelligence, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 26, 1867, at 3; Seduction, Abortion, and Death in Chi-
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an 1871 editorial titled "The Evil of the Age," noting that "thousands
of human beings are ... murdered before they have seen the light of
this world." 2 2 Similarly, the New York Tribune criticized " [t] he murder
of children, either before or after birth."' 2 - In 1869, the Catholic
Bishop Spaulding of Baltimore stated: "The murder of the infant
before its birth is ... as great a crime, as would be the killing of a child
after birth."' 2 4 The Maine Conference of the Congregational Church
described the practice as "the darkest picture that reason or taste
could allow" and suggested that it was worse than "the horrors of
intemperance, of slavery and of war."' 2 5
In light of the widespread focus by the medical profession, the
media of the day, and organized religion, one would expect to find a
clear historical record if the government were forcing healthcare
providers to violate these legal and professional rules and participate
in abortions during these pre-Roe periods. The absence of any such
record suggests that no such compulsion took place.
The restrictive abortion laws enacted during this period generally
remained in effect through the first half of the twentieth century, a
period described as "remarkably free from debate about abortion."12 6
C. Discussion of Healthcare Providers in Roe, Doe, and Casey
The Court in Roe, Doe, and Casey did not directly address whether
providers have a constitutional right to refuse to participate in abor-
tions. Nevertheless, those cases' discussion of the abortion right-and
particularly the discussion of medical personnel-is instructive for our
thinking about the historical ability of healthcare workers to decide
whether or not to participate in abortions.
First, the discussion of the abortion right in Roe suggests that a
physician will ultimately decide whether or not to perform the abor-
cago, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1857, at 5; The Hideous Vice. Close of the Trial of Dr. Wolfffor
Abortion, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 1871, at 3; The Ryan Malpractice Case-An Arrest, N.Y.
TIMEs,Jul. 20, 1869, at 3 (malpractice was frequently the technical charge for criminal
abortion).
122 Editorial, The Evil of the Age, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug 23, 1871, at 6; see also Editorial,
"The Least of These Little Ones. ", N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1870, at 4 (calling abortion an
offense that is "rank and smells to heaven.")
123 MOHR, supra note 72, at 180 (quoting N.Y. TRIm., Jan. 27 1868 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
124 Id. at 186 (quoting Pastoral Letter of the Most Reverend Archbishop and Suf-
fragan Prelates of the Province of Baltimore, at the Close of the Tenth Provincial
Council 9-11 (May 1869)).
125 Id. at 188-89.
126 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABoRTION 34 (1990).
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tion. Thus the Court explains that the decision to perform an abor-
tion is for the "attending physician, in consultation with his
patient." 27 Prior to viability, the Court explains that the physician is
"free to determine . . . that, in his medical judgment, the patient's
pregnancy should be terminated."12 8
After discussing the physicians' freedom to make the abortion
determination, the Court actually lodges the right at least in part with
the provider-noting that its decision "vindicates the right of the physi-
cian to administer medical treatment according to his professional
judgment."129 The Court acknowledged that the abortion decision is
"inherently and primarily, a medical decision" and that "basic respon-
sibility for it must rest with the physician." 30
Second, the Court commends the abortion decision to the physi-
cian's individual judgment with full knowledge that many doctors at
the time opposed abortion. For example, the Court noted that the
view that life begins at conception "is a view strongly held . .. by many
physicians." 3 1 The Court also cited to the AMA's resolution that
"[n]either physician, hospital, nor hospital personnel shall be
required to perform any act violative of personally-held moral
principles."13 2
Together, the Court's characterization of the abortion right as (at
least in part) a "right of the physician" 33 to exercise his or her own
medical judgment, and its acknowledgment that many physicians
would not perform abortions suggest that the Court did not under-
stand its decision in Roe as requiring physicians to perform abortions.
To the extent Roe left any doubt on the issue, the Court in Doe
described conscience protections in a Georgia abortion statute as
follows:
[T]he hospital itself is otherwise fully protected.... [T] he hospital
is free not to admit a patient for an abortion. It is even free not to
have an abortion committee. Further a physician or any other
employee has the right to refrain, for moral or religious reasons,
from participating in the abortion procedure. These provisions
127 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
130 Id. at 166.
131 Id. at 161.
132 Id. at 143 n.38; see also id. at 146-47 & n.40-41 (quoting Proceedings of the
AMA House of Delegates 220 (June 1970)) (noting that the American Bar Association
had recently formulated a proposed Uniform Abortion Act permitting early term
abortions).
133 Id. at 165.
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obviously are in the statute in order to afford appropriate protec-
tion to the individual and to the denominational hospital.134
The Court's reference to Georgia's conscience provisions as
"appropriate protection"135 for the hospital, the physician, "or any
other employee" 3 6 suggests that Roe was not understood by the Court
as requiring any person or organization to "participat[e] in the abor-
tion procedure."'37
In Casey, the Court again recognized the impact of abortion on
healthcare providers, explaining that the abortion decision was
"fraught with consequences"13 8 not only for the woman who requests
it but also "for the persons who perform and assist in the
procedure." 3 9
Together, Roe, Doe, and Casey demonstrate that the Court did not
understand the abortion right to include a right to force healthcare
providers to participate in abortions. Further, these decisions also
suggest that the Court viewed personal or organizational participation
in abortion to be matters which the providers would be "free to deter-
mine" for themselves, and that was at least an "appropriate" interest
for governmental protection.140
D. Response to Liberalization and Roe: Express State and Federal
Conscience Protections for Healthcare Providers
As the presence of the Georgia conscience protection in Doe
makes clear, even before Roe was decided, states that permitted abor-
tion were taking action to protect those physicians or hospitals who
objected to participation in abortions. In 1971, New York enacted a
criminal law prohibiting discrimination against any person for their
refusal to participate in abortions.141 Many other states-including
134 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973).
135 Id. at 198.
136 Id. at 197.
137 Id. at 198; see also Doe v. Bellin Mem'l Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 1973)
("The Georgia abortion statute which was reviewed in detail in Doe v. Bolton con-
tained [a conscience] provision. The Supreme Court did not expressly pass on the
validity of that provision, but since it was attacked in one of the amicus briefs, and
since the Court reviewed the entire statute in such detail, it is reasonable to infer that
it considered such authorization unobjectionable."(footnote omitted)).
138 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
139 Id. The Court also noted the "devastating psychological consequences" a
woman might suffer if she procured an abortion and only later learned facts which
might have led her to a different decision. Id. at 882.
140 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
141 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-i(1) (McKinney 2009) ("When the performing of
an abortion on a human being or assisting thereat is contrary to the conscience or
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Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kan-
sas, and Maryland-included explicit conscience protections for indi-
viduals and institutions in the same statutes that liberalized their
abortion laws.14 2
That trend of protecting conscientious objectors to abortions
continued and dramatically expanded in the aftermath of Roe. Today,
virtually every state in the country has some sort of statute protecting
individuals and, in many cases, entities who refuse to participate in
providing abortions.143 Most of these statutes arose in the decade fol-
religious beliefs of any person, he may refuse to perform or assist in such abortion by
filing a prior written refusal setting forth the reasons therefor with the appropriate
and responsible hospital, person, firm, corporation or association, and no such hospi-
tal, person, firm, corporation or association shall discriminate against the person so
refusing to act.").
142 1970 Alaska Sess. Laws 1 ("Nothing in this section requires a hospital or person
to participate in an abortion, nor is a hospital or person liable for refusing to partici-
pate in an abortion under this section."); 1968-69 Ark. Acts 179; 1967 Colo. Sess.
Laws 284; 57 Del. Laws 411 (1969-70); 1972 Fla. Laws 610; 1968 Ga. Laws 1436; 1970
Haw. Sess. Laws 1; 1969 Kan. Sess. Laws 452; 1968 Md. Laws 875.
143 See, e.g., NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., WHO DECIDES? THE STATUS OF
WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (2011), available at http://
www.prochoiceamerica.org/government-and-you/who-decides/who-decides-201 1.pdf
(last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (noting that forty-seven states and the District of Columbia
"allow certain individuals or entities to refuse to provide women specific reproductive-
health services, information, or referrals"). While an exhaustive list of the varying
formulations and purposes of state-law conscience protections is beyond the scope of
this Article, some representative examples include the following: ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.16.010(b) (2010) ("Nothing in this section requires a hospital or person to par-
ticipate in an abortion, nor is a hospital or person liable for refusing to participate in
an abortion under this section."); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2154(B) (Supp. 2010)
("A pharmacy, hospital or health professional, or any employee of a pharmacy, hospi-
tal or health professional, who states in writing an objection to abortion, abortion
medication, emergency contraception or any medication or device intended to
inhibit or prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum on moral or religious grounds is
not required to facilitate or participate in the provision of an abortion, abortion medi-
cation, emergency contraception or any medication or device intended to inhibit or
prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum."); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 453-16(e) (Lexis-
Nexis 2011) ("Nothing in this section shall require any hospital or any person to par-
ticipate in an abortion."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-611 (Supp. 2011) ("(2) No health
care professional shall be required to provide any health care service that violates his
or her conscience."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 146.1 (West 2005) ("An individual who may
lawfully perform, assist, or participate in medical procedures which will result in an
abortion shall not be required against that individual's religious beliefs or moral con-
victions to perform, assist, or participate in such procedures."); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 1903 (1964) ("No private institution or physician or no agent or employee of
such institution or physician shall be prohibited from refusing to provide family plan-
ning services when such refusal is based upon religious or conscientious objection.");
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214(a) (1), (b) (1) (LexisNexis 2009) ("A person
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lowing Roe.144 Some states expressly limit this protection to the prac-
tice of abortion, which is treated specially.' 4 5  Other states protect
conscience for other procedures as well. 1 4 6
At the federal level, Congress likewise took almost immediate
action after Roe to protect physicians and hospitals from being forced
to perform abortions. In particular, as part of legislation known as the
Church Amendment, Congress clarified that recipients of certain fed-
eral funds were not required to provide abortions, and that those facil-
may not be required to perform or participate in, or refer to any source for, any
medical procedure that results in artificial insemination, sterilization, or termination
of pregnancy. . . . A licensed hospital, hospital director, or hospital governing board
may not be required: (i) To permit, within the hospital, the performance of any medi-
cal procedure that results in artificial insemination, sterilization, or termination of
pregnancy; or (ii) To refer to any source for these medical procedures."); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145.414(a) (West 2011) ("No person and no hospital or institution shall be
coerced, held liable or discriminated against in any manner because of a refusal to
perform, accommodate, assist or submit to an abortion for any reason."); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:65A-1 to -2 (West 2011) ("No person shall be required to perform or assist
in the performance of an abortion or sterilization ... No hospital or other health care
facility shall be required to provide abortion or sterilization services or procedures.");
CONN. AGENCIEs REGs. § 19-13-D54 ("(f) No person shall be required to participate in
any phase of an abortion that violates his or her judgment, philosophical, moral or
religious beliefs.").
144 See Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14
J. LEGAL MED. 177, 180 (1993) ("Most conscience clause provisions were adopted
between 1973 and 1982, when the federal courts were broadly defining a new and very
controversial constitutional privacy right to abortion. Concern about discrimination
against individuals who, for religious or other moral reasons, objected to participating
in providing abortion services led to the widespread adoption of conscience clause
statutes.").
145 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453-16 (LexisNexis 2011).
146 For example, Illinois has a Health Care Right of Conscience Statute. See 745
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/2 (West 2010). The statute begins as follows:
The General Assembly finds and declares that people and organizations
hold different beliefs about whether certain health care services are morally
acceptable. It is the public policy of the State of Illinois to respect and pro-
tect the right of conscience of all persons who refuse to obtain, receive or
accept, or who are engaged in, the delivery of, arrangement for, or payment
of health care services and medical care whether acting individually, corpo-
rately, or in association with other persons; and to prohibit all forms of dis-
crimination, disqualification, coercion, disability or imposition of liability
upon such persons or entities by reason of their refusing to act contrary to
their conscience or conscientious convictions in refusing to obtain, receive,
accept, deliver, pay for, or arrange for the payment of health care services
and medical care.
Id.
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ities were prohibited from discriminating against employees who
refused to participate in abortions." 7
When inserting the particular language in the Church Amend-
ment that protects individual conscience, Representative Heinz said
the following:
Mr. Chairman, freedom of conscience is one of the most sacred,
inviolable rights that all men hold dear. With the Supreme Court
decision legalizing abortion under certain circumstances, the
House must now assure people who work in hospitals, clinics, and
other such health institutions that they will never be forced to
engage in any procedure that they regard as morally abhorrent.
[In addition to protecting institutions from being forced to perform
abortions,] we must also guarantee that that no hospital will dis-
charge, or suspend the staff privileges of, any person because he or
she either cooperates or refuses to cooperate in the performance of
a lawful abortion or sterilization because of moral convictions....
Congress must clearly state that it will not tolerate discrimination of
any kind against health personnel because of their beliefs or actions
with regard to abortions or sterilizations. I ask, therefore, that the
House approve my amendment .... .41
Without further discussion, the House promptly passed the
amendment and the bill by an overwhelming margin: 372-1.149 The
Church Amendment was ultimately enacted and signed into law in
1973.150
147 42 U.S.C. § 300a (2006) provides:
No entity which receives a grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under the
Public Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health Centers Act, or
the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act after
June 18, 1973, may-(A) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or
termination of employment of any physician or other health care personnel,
or (B) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges to any physi-
cian or other health care personnel, because he performed or assisted in the
performance of a lawful sterilization procedure or abortion, because he
refused to perform or assist in the performance of such a procedure or abor-
tion on the grounds that his performance or assistance in the performance
of the procedure or abortion would be contrary to his religious beliefs or
moral convictions, or because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions
respecting sterilization procedures or abortions.
Id. at §300a-7(c) (1) (internal citations omitted).
148 119 CONG. REc. 17,462-63 (1973).
149 See id.
150 When the Senate considered the Church Amendment, Senator Ted Kennedy
said the following:
Congress has the authority under the Constitution to exempt individuals
from any requirement that they perform medical procedures that are objec-
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In the years since Roe, Congress has enacted additional laws
designed to protect healthcare workers who refuse to participate in
abortions. For example, in 1996 Congress enacted the Danforth
Amendment to prohibit "[a] bortion-related discrimination in govern-
mental activities regarding training and licensing of physicians."1 5 1 In
particular, the law prevents governments from discriminating against
healthcare providers who refuse to provide a range of abortion-related
services and protects doctors, medical students, and health training
programs.'5 2 The Danforth Amendment protects refusals to partici-
pate in abortion or abortion-related services for any reason, and it is
not limited to religious objections.s53 Likewise, in 2005, Congress
enacted the Hyde-Weldon Amendment, designed to strip federal
funding from any institution that forces an individual to participate in
an abortion against her will.154
Thus in a variety of ways, and at both the state and federal levels,
legislators acted quickly, decisively, and at times nearly unanimously
to protect conscience rights in the wake of Roe. These protections
extended not only to direct personal performance of an abortion, but
more broadly to providers who have an objection to being forced to
"participate," "refer," "assist," "arrange for," "admit any patient for,"
"allow the use of hospital facilities for," "accommodate," or "advise"
concerning abortion.'55 The speed and near ubiquity of these laws
demonstrates that a great majority of Americans at the time-regard-
tionable to their religious convictions. Indeed, in many cases, the Constitu-
tion itself is sufficient to grant an exemption to protect persons from official
acts that infringe on their free exercise of religion.
119 CONG. REc. 9602 (1973). He therefore supported the "full protection to the relig-
ious freedom of physicians and others." Id.
151 42 U.S.C. § 238(n) (2006).
152 See id. ("The Federal Government, and any State or local government that
receives Federal financial assistance, may not subject any health care entity [defined
to include individuals] to discrimination on the basis that . . . the entity refuses to
undergo training in the performance of induced abortions, to require or provide
such training, to perform such abortions, or to provide referrals for such training or
such abortions.").
153 See id.
154 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809,
3163 (2004); see also Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161,
§ 508 (d) (1), 121 Stat. 1844, 2209 (2009) ("None of the funds made available in this
Act may be made available to a Federal agency or program, or to a State or local
government, if such agency, program, or government subjects any institutional or
individual health care entity to discrimination on the basis that the health care entity
does not provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.").
155 See 42 U.S.C. §300a-7(c) (1) (2006); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 852, 882 (1992); NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., supra note 143.
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less of their disputes as to the merits of the underlying abortion ques-
tion-agreed that the government should not have the power to
compel participation in abortions by unwilling individuals and
institutions.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN ABORTIONS
In light of these historical facts, can it be said that the healthcare
provider's right not to participate in abortions is one of "those funda-
mental rights and liberties, which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition,"' 1 5 6 "and implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed'"?157 As discussed in more detail below, the answer is
yes. The unique history of abortion-related conscience protections
shows a collective judgment, arguably over the entire history of the
nation, that healthcare providers should not be forced by the govern-
ment to participate in abortions against their will. That history satis-
fies the Court's stated inquiry for protection of substantive rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the historical analysis for
a right to refuse satisfies the Court's test far better than the histories
upon which the Court relied in Roe and Lawrence. Furthermore, the
right to refuse falls within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest for self-definition as described in Casey and Lawrence,
and is needed to protect providers from the types of psychological
harm recognized as supporting the abortion right in Roe.
A. Broader Historical Underpinnings
The protection of individual conscience from governmental com-
pulsion is a long-honored value in American history, pre-dating even
the Constitution. While there have been intense debates about
whether such protection is required under the Free Exercise Clause (at
least for religion-based claims of conscience), or was and is simply a
matter of legislative grace, there can be little dispute that such protec-
tion is deeply rooted in American history and culture.
Many of the earliest colonial settlements were established in
order to secure the freedom of conscience on matters related to relig-
ion. When these original settlements proved to hold too cramped a
view of freedom of conscience-allowing the freedom only to certain
156 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 707, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
157 Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1932)).
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people or certain religious sects-new colonies emerged to provide
even greater freedom. 15 8
This emphasis on freedom of conscience had not waned by the
time of the Founding. Thomas Jefferson, for example, wrote that the
government had "authority over such natural rights only as we have
submitted to them. The rights of conscience we never submitted, we
could not submit."159 Jefferson also maintained that forcing a person
even to contribute money to a cause to which he or she abhorred was
"tyrannical."16 0
James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments likewise asserted the inalienability of conscience rights:
"The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it
as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable
right." 61 In fact, Madison described conscience as "the most sacred
of all property"'6 2 and considered it "the particular glory of this coun-
try, to have secured the rights of conscience which in other nations
are least understood or most strangely violated."' 63
George Washington wrote that "the establishment of Civil and
Religious Liberty was the Motive that induced me to the field of bat-
tle,"1 64 and believed that the government should accommodate per-
sons on the basis of conscience: "l[T]he conscientious scruples of all
men should be treated with great delicacy and tenderness: and it is my
wish and desire, that the laws may always be extensively accommo-
dated to them, as a due regard for the protection and essential inter-
ests of the nation may justify and permit."165
158 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1424-25 (1990) (noting that Rhode Island was
founded by Roger Williams as a refuge for dissenters from the Massachusetts estab-
lishment). Professor McConnell also describes how a variety of state and local govern-
ments provided exemptions from various laws to accommodate religious objectors.
See id. at 1466-73. For an alternative view of this history as it relates to the Free
Exercise Clause, see Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption:
An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 915 (1992).
159 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 265 (1782).
160 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 439 (1779).
161 JAMES MADISON, Memo7ial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785),
in SELECTED WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 21-27 (Ralph Ketcham ed. 2006).
162 JAMES MADISON, Property (1792), in Madison supra, note 161, at 223.
163 James Madison, Speech in Congress on Religious Exemptions from Militia
Duty (Dec. 22, 1790).
164 MICHAEL NovAK & JANA NovAK, WASHINGTON's GOD 111 (2006).
165 GEORGE WASHINGTON, Letter to the Annual Meeting of Quakers (1789), in THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 266 (Dorothy Twohig ed. 1993).
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Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has echoed the Founders'
concerns about protecting conscience in a variety of contexts. For
example, the Court has stated that "[f] reedom of conscience and free-
dom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as
the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law."16 6 Elsewhere,
the Court considered a public school policy requiring students to
recite the pledge of allegiance against their will.' 6 7 The Court
explained:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein....
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their
power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the
purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve
from all official control.' 68
In the course of interpreting statutory protections for conscien-
tious objectors to military service, the Court viewed the protection
broadly, as extending not only to religious objectors, but also to "all
those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or
religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed
themselves to become a part of an instrument of war." 1 6 9
When the Court has deemed the Free Exercise Clause somewhat
less protective of individual conscience rights, state and federal legisla-
tors have often acted to provide additional protections. For example,
although the Court has never recognized a constitutional right of con-
scientious objectors to avoid military service, Congress has generally
provided such protection.170
166 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
167 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
168 Id. at 642.
169 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970). The Court noted that statu-
tory exemptions for conscientious objectors had a long history. Early colonial char-
ters and state constitutions spoke of freedom of conscience as a right, and during the
Revolutionary War, many states granted exemptions from conscription to Quakers,
Mennonites, and others with religious beliefs against war. See id. at 343.
170 See, e.g., Universal Military Training and Service Act, Act of March 3, 1863, ch.
75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863) (providing exemption for Civil War era draft for members of
religious groups objecting on moral grounds). Interestingly, the cases holding that
there is no constitutional right to such exemptions pre-date the modern substantive
due process regime, and therefore did not address whether the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects a substantive liberty interest in this regard.
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Likewise, under cases such as Wisconsin v. Yoder 71and Sherbert v.
Verner,172 the Supreme Court used to afford strong protections to indi-
vidual claims of religious conscientious objection, requiring a compel-
ling state interest before substantial burdens could be imposed. In
1990, however, the Court lessened this protection in Smith, allowing
that substantial burdens on religious exercise would be permitted pur-
suant to neutral and generally applicable laws.' 7 3 Believing the
Court's test to be insufficient to protect religious objectors, Congress
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), to restore
the standards from Yoder and Sherbert.174 While RFRA remains in
force as a statutory standard governing federal infringements on relig-
ion, the Court invalidated RFRA's provisions applicable to state gov-
ernments.17 5 In response, many state governments enacted their own
RFRA laws, and state supreme courts interpreted their constitutional
protections of free exercise consistent with the previous standard.17 6
B. Abortion and Conscience-The Right Not to Participate in Abortions
Our nation's general commitment to rights of conscience has
been even greater in the specific context of abortion. Historically,
healthcare providers had a general common law freedom to choose
whether or not to accept a particular patient for treatment, even in
emergencies.1 7 7 There is no historical indication that this freedom
was restricted in the abortion context. To the contrary, many histori-
cal accounts-including those by Mohr, Means, and the Court in
Roe-clearly aim to show abortion as widely available, tolerated, and at
least partially legal. Yet none presents evidence of any kind of govern-
ment requirement that it be provided, much less that it be provided
by any particular unwilling provider. Rather, all of these sources note
that many providers refuse to perform abortions, but nowhere suggest
that the law required (or even should require) otherwise. This is con-
sistent with the common law ability of physicians to refuse patients
generally, even in emergencies.
This record suggests that healthcare providers were historically
free to refuse to participate in abortions. In fact, these historical
accounts suggest that, far from requiring providers to perform abor-
171 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
172 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
173 See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
174 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
175 See id.
176 See, e.g., Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
35/1 (West 2001) (enacting a RFRA statute in the state of Illinois).
177 See supra Part II.A.2.
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tions, these governments treated those who provided abortions quite
harshly, in that they could be hanged if a woman died from an abor-
tion-a severe disincentive to say the least. Likewise, both the Hippo-
cratic Oath and the earliest English and American codes of medical
ethics forbade providing abortions, which would be odd if, in fact, the
government could require them. 178 Legal restrictions on providing
abortions extended to pharmacists and apothecaries.
Furthermore, the emphasis on quickening in the Roe version of
history tends to confirm that, at the very least, providers were never
forced to perform abortions once pregnancy was clearly established. That
is, for many centuries, quickening was the only sure sign of pregnancy;
until quickening, pregnancy could not be definitively established.
Given that even the Roe version of history suggests that abortions after
quickening were illegal at English common law and in early American
law, it seems clear that physicians were never forced to perform abor-
tions once they were sure the woman was pregnant, because such
abortions were illegal.
Other liberties have been granted Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tection with far more restrictive pasts. For example, the Court in Roe
acknowledged that abortion was widely prohibited for more than a
century prior to its decision, and was a crime after quickening for cen-
turies before that. Yet the Court found that, historically, "abortion
was viewed with less disfavor" and that women "enjoyed a substantially
broader right to terminate a pregnancy" at common law than at the
time of Roe. 7 9 The Court also noted that the law treated abortions
earlier in pregnancy less punitively than later abortions.s 0 Based on
178 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-48 (1973).
179 Id. at 140.
180 Id. at 140-41. The Court's discussion of laws banning suicide in Glucksberg
provides an interesting contrast on the question of how the Court thinks about differ-
ent penalties. When asked to find a fundamental right to assisted suicide, the Court
explained that suicide and assisting suicide had been crimes for centuries and that,
even when penalties were lowered, "courts continued to condemn [suicide] as a grave
public wrong" and that suicide was deemed a "grievous, though nonfelonious,
wrong." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 714 (1997). Concurring in Gluck-
sberg, Justice Souter explained: "The reasons for the decriminalization, after all, may
have had more to do with difficulties of law enforcement than with a shift in the value
ascribed to life in various circumstances or in the perceived legitimacy of taking one's
own." Id. at 776-77 (Souter,J., concurring). Dellapenna argues quite plausibly that
the quickening distinction, to the extent it existed, was largely the result of an eviden-
tiary problem-until quickening, there was no clear evidence of pregnancy. The
Court did not discuss this possibility when relying on the more relaxed criminal treat-
ment of early term abortions in Roe. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 96.
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this analysis, the Court found the abortion right to have sufficient his-
torical grounding for Fourteenth Amendment protection. 81
Likewise, in Lawrence, the Court noted that non-procreative sex-
ual conduct was widely prohibited for centuries, but observed that
there was "no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at
homosexual conduct as a distinct matter." 82 The Court also found
that the infrequency of prosecutions for engaging in such conduct
made it "difficult to say that society approved of a rigorous and system-
atic punishment of consensual acts committed in private and by
adults."' 83 Based on this history, the court found that the right
upheld in Lawrence had sufficient historical grounding for substantive
due process protection.
The apparent pre-Roe historical liberty of healthcare providers
not to be compelled by government to participate in abortion proce-
dures thus compares quite favorably to the liberty interests described
in Roe and in Lawrence. In each of those cases, the Court took a prac-
tice which was actually expressly illegal and found it protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. In contrast, there is no historical evidence
that it was illegal for a healthcare provider to refuse to participate in
abortions. Far from being illegal, refusing to perform an abortion was
affirmatively legally required conduct in many circumstances, to the
extent abortion was criminalized at least at certain stages. Prosecu-
tions for such refusals do not appear to be merely "infrequent" as in
Lawrence-they appear to be nonexistent entirely. Those who per-
formed abortions contravened accepted medical ethics and were pun-
ished severely by the government for errors made in the process.
Based on this pre-Roe history alone, it seems clear that the right of
providers to not perform abortions meets the Court's historical test
for Fourteenth Amendment protection, and does so better than other
rights the Court has recognized.
But it is the near unanimous-and virtually immediate-action of
state and federal governments to protect conscience in the wake of
181 Justice Rehnquist offered an alternative interpretation of this history in his Roe
dissent:
The fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority
sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a
century is a strong indication, it seems to me, that the asserted right to an
abortion is not "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental."
Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
182 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003).
183 Id. at 569-70.
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Roe that marks the conscience right as fundamental and as unique in
our history.
In the years prior to Roe, at least fourteen states had already liber-
alized their abortion laws.' 84 The American Medical Association-
which since its founding had vocally opposed abortion-in 1970
resolved to make abortion more available based on the standards of
"sound clinical judgment" and "informed patient consent." 85 As set
forth above in Part II.D, this pre-Roe liberalization of abortion laws
frequently came with the creation of express statutory protection for
physicians and other healthcare personnel and institutions who
refused to participate in abortions. For example, while supporting
greater access to abortion, the AMA also resolved that "[n] either phy-
sician, hospital, nor hospital personnel shall be required to perform
any act violative of personally-held moral principles."'"'
Once the Court's decision in Roe established a constitutional
right to abortion, state and federal legislatures acted quickly and deci-
sively to confirm that no physician could be forced to provide an abor-
tion. Today, nearly every state has a conscience statute or clause to
protect providers from being forced to participate in abortions.1 8 7
Federal legislators likewise moved immediately and with near unanim-
ity to protect healthcare workers from being forced to participate in
abortions.188 Perhaps taking their cue from the AMA resolution that
neither individuals nor institutions "shall be required to perform any
act violative of personally-held moral principles," these laws were not
limited to the direct performance of abortion, but rather protected
against compulsion to participate more broadly, including by referral
or providing space.189 There is no indication that these legislative
actions were understood to be changing the pre-Roe status quo. To
the contrary, they appear designed to protect the liberty of providers
184 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 140-41 ("In the past several years, however, a trend toward
liberalization of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by about one-third of the
States, of less stringent laws, most of them patterned after the ALI Model Penal Code
185 Id. at 143.
186 Id. at 143-44 n.38; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing
Cyril Means's approval of New York liberalization bill protecting physician
conscience).
187 For physicians whose objection to performing abortions is religious in nature,
many states provide additional protections either directly through their constitutional
protections of free exercise, or through state Religious Freedom Restoration Act stat-
utes. See, e.g., Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1
(containing a RFRA statute).
188 See supra Part II.D.
189 See id.
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to continue refusing to perform abortions once abortion was widely
permitted.
Beyond the speed and near-unanimity with which conscience
clauses appeared on the state and federal legislative scene, perhaps
the most remarkable aspect of their development is the fact that many
who strongly favor abortion rights also favor conscience rights. As
noted above, Justice Blackmun referred to conscience provisions as
"appropriate protection" for objecting physicians and other health-
care personnel. 190 Senator Ted Kennedy-frequently criticized from
the right for his support for legalized abortion-strongly supported
conscience rights in the form of the Church Amendment.191 Presi-
dent Obama identifies himself as a supporter of Roe,192 but likewise
says he supports some sort of conscience protection. 93 Indeed, even
NARAL Pro-Choice America acknowledges that conscience protec-
tions for individual objectors "may" be appropriate.194
The speed and near unanimity of these legislative actions confirm
that the right not to be forced by the government to perform abor-
tions is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. For decades, abor-
tion has been the most divisive political, social, and ethical issue in the
country. Partisans on the two sides disagree over everything. They
cannot agree on science. (Can a fetus feel pain at twelve weeks or
twenty or twenty-eight?) They cannot agree on history. (Was pre-
quickening abortion a crime at common law or not?) They cannot
even agree on language. (Is it a "fetus", "baby", or the "products of
conception"? Should the sides of the dispute be labeled as "pro-life,"
190 See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198 (1973).
191 See supra note 150.
192 See Statement ofPresident Obama on the 36th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade, THE WHITE
HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/StatementofPresidentObama
onthe36thAnniversaryofRoevWade/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) ("I remain commit-
ted to protecting a woman's right to choose.... [And] more broadly to ensuring that
our daughters have the same rights and opportunities as our sons: the chance to
attain a world-class education; to have fulfilling careers in any industry; to be treated
fairly and paid equally for their work; and to have no limits on their dreams. That is
what I want for women everywhere.").
193 See Obama, supra note 20.
194 See Refusal to Provide Medical Services, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., http://www.pro
choiceamerica.org/what-is-choice/fast-facts/refusal-to-provide-medical.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 25, 2011) (opposing conscience protection for institutions such as Catholic
hospitals, but acknowledging that "[a] Ithough carefully crafted refusal clauses may be
acceptable in some circumstances to protect individuals who oppose certain treat-
ments, broad refusal clauses deny women medically necessary information, referrals,
and services. In addition, even if individual medical providers are protected, health-
care corporations should not be allowed broadly to deny women access to necessary
medical services and information.").
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"pro-choice," "anti-abortion," "pro-abortion" or something else?) Yet
amidst this widespread, heated and seemingly endless disagreement,
we see something remarkable: essentially unanimous agreement from
state and federal governments that providers should not be forced to
participate in abortions.
This broad agreement dwarfs the liberalization trends the Court
noted in Roe and in Lawrence. In Roe, the Court noted "about one-
third" of the states had recently changed their abortion laws.195 In
Lawrence, the Court observed that "[o]ver the course of the last
decades" nine states had moved toward abolishing their laws targeting
homosexual sex. 196 In contrast, here virtually all of the states in the
union and the federal government have declared their view that the
government cannot compel healthcare providers to participate in
abortions. They have all done so "in the past half century"-i.e., the
period of time the Supreme Court deems to have the "most rele-
vance"-and they did so rapidly upon the legalization of abortion. 97
This broad historical case and nearly-unanimous state and legisla-
tive agreement also rebuts the common argument that because prov-
iders enjoy a "monopolistic state-granted license[ ]" they should be
required to "subordinat[e] personal religious or moral beliefs to the
needs of patients." 98 Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, the
practice of medicine in the United States was regulated by the states.
While the Court in Roe may have found a historically "broader right"
to obtain abortions in earlier times, 199 there is no indication that free-
dom ever included the right or ability to compel participation by
unwilling providers, whether through licensing or otherwise. Thus
the historical argument suggests that, at least since that time, physi-
cians and nurses were at liberty to refuse to perform abortions, even
195 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 (1973).
196 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003).
197 Id. at 571-72.
198 See Martha S. Swartz, "Conscience Clauses" or "Unconscionable Clauses": Personal
Beliefs Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 269, 277
(2006) ("[W] hile health care professionals should be encouraged to refuse to partici-
pate in treatment that violates the generally accepted professional standards of prac-
tice applicable to their professions, the monopolistic state-granted licenses that
medical professionals receive should preclude these professionals from injecting their
personal beliefs into their professional practices. . . . The provision of medically indi-
cated health care should be the health care professional's primary responsibility, sub-
ordinating personal religious or moral beliefs to the needs of patients.").
199 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 140.
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though no one forced them to become medical professionals, 200 and
even though they were subject to government licensing standards.
This conclusion is strengthened by the nearly unanimous and
nearly universal adoption of statutory conscience protections for med-
ical professionals in the wake of Roe. By the 1970s, of course, the med-
ical profession was highly regulated. These statutory protections thus
confirm a long-held and broadly-held view that licensed healthcare
providers, who had voluntarily chosen such careers, 201 retained the
right to choose not to participate in abortions. Likewise, these laws
show that the abortion right-even since Roe-has not been generally
understood to include a right to force participation by unwilling prov-
iders, even licensed ones.
In any case, it is clear that the right to an abortion recognized in
Roe is a right to be free from undue governmental interference with
one's efforts to obtain an abortion. 202 Nothing in Roe or Casey sug-
200 As a general matter, the argument that a person does not have to be a doctor,
nurse, or pharmacist-or that a person can or should be forced to surrender constitu-
tional rights as a condition of pursuing these professions-is at odds with our broader
constitutional tradition. For example, in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), the
Court found that a black law student had a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
right to attend the then-segregated University of Texas Law School. In Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), the Court found public school teachers had a First
Amendment speech and association right to obtain such employment without being
forced to certify whether they had ever been members of the Communist Party. In
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the Court held that a candidate for public
office had a right to pursue that office without being forced to "declare a belief in
.... 'the existence of God.'" Id. at 490. In all of these cases, the Court could have
argued that the plaintiff "didn't have to be" a lawyer or a teacher or a public office-
holder-and presumably all of the plaintiffs in the cases could have obtained employ-
ment in a different field. Yet in each case the Court accepted the plaintiff's chosen
career path and analyzed whether the government did or did not have the power to
impose the relevant burdens.
201 The Fourteenth Amendment also separately protects the rights of individuals
to choose "to engage in any of the common occupations of life." Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). This right is particularly implicated where a government
action would amount to "a complete prohibition of [one's] right to engage in a call-
ing." Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 292 (1999). Thus the argument that "the gov-
ernment did not force you to become a doctor, nurse, or pharmacist" misses the
mark-the question is not whether the government forced someone to enter a cer-
tain profession, but whether the government violates the Constitution by imposing
certain requirements, or by prohibiting, for example, obstetricians or pharmacists
from practicing unless they will agree to participate in abortions. Cf Shaw v. Hosp.
Auth., 507 F.2d 625, 628 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that a physician, "in seeking staff
privileges at [a] hospital, seeks to engage in his occupation . . . and this is a liberty
interet protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
202 Generally speaking, rights recognized or granted by the Constitution are rights
against the government-they are not rights to force other private individuals to par-
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gests that the right to an abortion includes the right to compel unwill-
ing private healthcare providers to provide them. To the contrary, the
Court in Roe established a right to abortion not only for pregnant
women, but also for their physicians. Thus, the Court spoke of "the
right of the physician" to perform abortions and to administer treat-
ment according to her judgment. 203 Presumably this right to make
judgments includes the option to make alternative judgments and
decide not to perform abortions. In this manner, allowing a physician
room to decide not to perform abortions is actually entirely consistent
with Roe.204
Furthermore, the Court has found that the abortion right recog-
nized in Roe does not even include the right to have the government
provide or even pay for abortions. In Maher v. Roe, the Court rejected
the argument that unwilling governments could be forced to provide or
pay for abortions, finding that Roe v. Wade did not create any obliga-
tion on the state to affirmatively provide the service. 205 If the right
established in Roe and Casey does not include even having the govern-
ment pay for an abortion, it surely cannot include having the govern-
ment use its power over licenses to make an unwilling private individual
actually perform one, even if that individual holds a government license.
For these reasons, the healthcare provider's right not to partici-
pate in abortions qualifies under the historical test for protection
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
ticipate in or facilitate one's own behavior. Thus, for example, although a shopper
has a First Amendment right to purchase a Bible or a pornographic magazine (or
both, since there is no constitutional requirement of consistency), that right does not
include a right to have the government force any particular unwilling bookseller to
sell either one. Likewise, Lawrence recognized a Fourteenth Amendment right to
engage in private homosexual sex, but it would be absurd to suggest the right
includes having the government force unwilling private individuals to participate in
the exercise of that right.
203 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
204 Likewise, for the reasons set forth above, such a right is also consistent with the
discussion of physicians in Doe and Casey. Protection for this sphere of individual
physician decision making is also quite consistent with the constitutional principle
that the right to do something usually includes the right to decide not to do it. See, e.g.,
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (First Amendment right to free speech
includes right not to speak); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (Free
Exercise Clause protects the right not to worship).
205 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
316 (1980) ("[I]t simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries
with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full
range of protected choices. The reason why was explained in Maher although gov-
ernment may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of
choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation.").
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C. Refusal and the Casey/Lawrence Self-Definition Right
The Court's substantive due process decisions also emphasize the
importance of permitting the individual to make decisions about cer-
tain issues without government compulsion. Both Casey and Lawrence
indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment will protect rights not only
for their importance to individuals when those rights are exercised,
but also because the act of making one's own decisions about certain
matters without government compulsion is itself part of the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Court explained:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child rearing, and education. Our cases recognize "the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Our
precedents "have respected the private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter." These matters, involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices cen-
tral to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these mat-
ters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.206
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment's protections extend to not
only to actions, but also to the right to make one's own decisions about
certain subjects without "compulsion of the State." 207 The Court
explained the reason for this protection, namely that the ability to
make one's own decisions about these issues "define [s] the attributes
of personhood" and is therefore protected from government
invasion. 208
In establishing an individual right to make one's own decisions
about such matters, Casey builds on Roe. The Court's decision in Roe
was premised on the idea that the judiciary is incapable of determin-
ing when life begins2 09 and that government more broadly does not
206 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (internal
citations and emphasis omitted).
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158-59 (1973) (holding thata fetus is not a
"person" and therefore lacks Fourteenth Amendment or other constitutional rights
until birth, but stating that "the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer" to the question of when
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have the power to "adopt[ ] one theory of life" and use it to override
the rights of the pregnant woman. 210 Casey moves from this acknowl-
edgement of governmental inability to make this decision to an
affirmative recognition of an individual liberty interest in making the
decision on one's own, and without government compulsion.
It is commonly objected that the Casey/Lawrence "mystery of life"
description of the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is too
broad and philosophical to usefully describe the protected rights. 2 11
Indeed, generally speaking, courts have restricted use of this passage
life begins); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (noting that the right to make such deci-
sions and that "[b]eliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of per-
sonhood were they formed under compulsion of the State").
210 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. In this regard, Casey also provides a strong rebuttal to
arguments advanced to require pharmacists to sell the morning after pill. Some advo-
cates of such laws argue that the morning after pill does not really cause abortions,
because they simply inhibit pregnancy by stopping a fertilized egg from implanting.
See, e.g., Lou Dobbs Tonight (CNN television broadcast Dec. 1, 2005) (statement of Illi-
nois Governor Rod Blagojevich) (" [T]he rationale is that when a doctor or nurse has
a moral objection to performing an abortion, which is a legitimate concern, that they
would be precluded from having to do that. In the case of a pharmacist . . . the
morning after pill or contraceptives don't terminate pregnancies, what they do is pre-
vent pregnancies, and that's far different from performing an abortion."). While of
course the government is free to "adopt[ ] one theory of life" for certain purposes-
for example, to classify Plan B or ella as contraceptives rather than abortifacient
drugs- Casey does not provide room to force unwilling private actors to act accord-
ingly. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. In this regard, the Casey self-definition principle func-
tions similarly to other areas of constitutional law in which we generally do not permit
courts or the government to "disprove" a stated religious belief or objection. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) ("However, the resolution of that
question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice
in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or compre-
hensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection."); id. at 715 ("We
see, therefore, that Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew
was an unreasonable one. Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs
because the believer admits that he is 'struggling' with his position or because his
beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated
person might employ."); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ("Men may
believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs.").
211 See, e.g., John H. Garvey, Control Freaks, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 3, 4 (1998) (noting
that the passage "sounds like a bad freshman philosophy paper" and arguing that the
right as phrased "is too powerful," and would allow each of us to claim a right to do
virtually anything to define ourselves, and ultimately leaves us needing "to find a way
to distinguish some choices from others"); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that if the self-definition passage from
Casey and Lawrence "calls into question the government's power to regulate actions
based on one's self-defined 'concept of existence, etc.,' it is the passage that ate the
rule of law").
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to cases involving abortion and gay rights (the subject matters of Casey
and Lawrence).2 12 When lower courts attempted to extend this pas-
sage to establish a right to assisted suicide, the Supreme Court
resisted, explaining that Casey required a confluence of two factors:
personal importance and history.
By choosing this language, the Court's opinion in Casey described,
in a general way and in light of our prior cases, those personal activ-
ities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted
in our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of
constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. The opinion moved from the recognition that
liberty necessarily includes freedom of conscience and belief about
ultimate considerations to the observation that "though the abor-
tion decision may originate within the zone of conscience and
belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise." That many of the rights
and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal
autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and
all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected
213
While it is certainly true that this right to self-definition is worded
expansively-and it could not possibly actually protect every way in
which an individual might choose to define herself-there are strong
reasons to believe that this self-definitional right should extend to
healthcare providers who do not wish to be compelled to participate
in abortions. First, as set forth above in Parts II and III, there is a
strong historical case to support the right to refuse. This places the
right to refuse in much better standing than the rejected right to
assisted suicide (which had been illegal for at least 700 years) and
even better than the recognized rights to abortion and to engage in
private homosexual sex (both of which had been illegal at least for
large portions of our history). To the extent the "mystery of life" pas-
sage really means that the Fourteenth Amendment protects those
rights that are both (a) strongly grounded in history and tradition,
and (b) involve very important decisions about personal involvement
in sexual matters and abortion, the right to refuse passes this test.
Second, while it is fair to speculate as to what other situations the
"mystery of life" right should cover, no speculation should be needed
in the abortion context because the Court has already deemed that
212 See Trent L. Pepper, The "Mystery of Life" in the Lower Courts: The Influence of the
Mystery Passage on American Jurisprudence, 51 How. L.J. 335 (2008) (cataloguing lower
court uses of the passage since Casey).
213 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
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particular decision to be one of the protected decisions, at least for
the pregnant woman. As the Supreme Court has noted, abortion is
simply different from all other medical procedures because other pro-
cedures "do not involve the termination of a potential human life."214
For a physician as much as for a pregnant woman, the ability to form
one's own "beliefs about ... matters" such as abortion can "define the
attributes of personhood."215 Likewise for the healthcare worker as
much as for the pregnant woman "the abortion decision may origi-
nate within the zone of conscience and belief, [but] it is more than a
philosophic exercise."216
For these reasons, the Fourteenth Amendment should likewise
protect the healthcare provider's right to make that decision on her
own, based on her own judgments about the value of life, rather than
"under compulsion of the State." A law compelling the provider to
use her hands, mind, and skills to participate in abortions against her
will would infringe upon the provider's ability to define her own per-
sonhood-namely, as a person who would not participate in an abor-
tion.217 Such a law would deprive the worker of her right to define
her own "concept of existence" and of the "mystery of human life" as
to the abortion question.
Similarly, Casey acknowledges that the pregnant woman's destiny
"must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiri-
tual imperatives and her place in society."218 Forcing a healthcare
provider to participate against her will would deprive her of the corre-
sponding right to shape her own destiny based on "her own conception
of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society."219 Roe and Casey
teach us that the fetus does not enjoy these protections because it has
214 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
649 (1979) ("The abortion decision has implications far broader than those associ-
ated with most other kinds of medical treatment.").
215 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
216 Id. at 852.
217 For example, the Christian Medical and Dental Association is a group of
approximately 16,000 healthcare providers. According to their website, the group's
goals include "educating and equipping Christian doctors and students ... to serve
with professional excellence as witnesses of Christ's love and compassion . . . ." See
CMDA Mission & Beliefs, CHRISTIAN MED. & DENTAL Ass'N, http://www.cmda.org/
WCM/CMDA/Navigation/About/MissionsBeliefs/Missions Beliefs.aspx (last visited
Sept. 25, 2011). The members of the group quite explicitly seek to define themselves,
at least in part, by their refusal to participate in abortion. See CMDA Ethics Statements,
CHRISTIAN MED. & DENTAL Ass'N, http://www.cmda.org/WCM/media/pdf/CMDA
EthicsStatementsworeferences10.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
218 Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
219 Id.
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not been deemed a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment. But
the healthcare provider, of course, is a "person," and it is logical to
conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment should equally protect the
right of each "person" in the room to be able to decide whether or
not to participate based on her own "spiritual imperatives" and view of
"her place in society." This is particularly true where, as here, the two
people are involved in the same event, at the same time, in the same
place, and are facing the same moral question about the character
and moral value of the fetus or embryo to be terminated.
One possible argument against this analysis might be the conten-
tion that the formation of beliefs about abortion is more personal and
defining for the woman who procures an abortion than for the
woman who performs it. At one level, this is undeniably true, as the
abortion happens inside the body of only one of the two participants,
and concerns the actual or potential offspring of only one of the par-
ticipants. One might be tempted to say that Casey's right-to-make-self-
defining-decisions principle only applies to the decision of the preg-
nant woman, but not that of her physician.
This argument ultimately fails for four reasons. First, it provides
no response to the historical argument that the freedom of healthcare
providers to decide not to perform abortions is sufficiently established
to merit constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.220 Second, there is no evidence to support the notion that
healthcare providers do not consider the services they provide to be
self-defining. Indeed, for a provider who has made a religious, moral,
or conscience-based decision not to participate in abortions, it is
entirely likely that the decision is very much a part of her definition of
herself.221 Third, such an approach would wrongly suggest that "one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life"22 2 is implicated only in decisions related to sex
and childbearing, but not in matters relating to whether one will use
one's mind, hands, and skills to terminate life or potential life. A phy-
sician forced against her will to provide abortions would have a strong
argument that being forced to use her hands and instruments to
reach into another's womb and end a pregnancy as much implicates
her beliefs about "the mystery of human life" and her self-definition as
220 See supra Part III.B.
221 See supra note 217 (describing how the approximately 16,000 members of the
Christian Medical and Dental Association expressly define themselves and their group
by their unwillingness to provide abortions).
222 Casey, 505 U.S. at 581.
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do her decisions about sexual matters. 223 It would be odd for the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect the self-defining ability to make
one's own decisions about the "mystery of life" and "one's own con-
cept of existence" only when those decisions relate to personal sexual
matters, but not when they directly relate to personal participation in
abortions.
Ultimately, however, the strongest evidence that decisions about
abortion are "personal" enough for healthcare workers to merit Four-
teenth Amendment protection is provided by the words and exper-
iences of those who have actually performed them. As set forth in the
next section, even those who firmly believe in protecting the right to
abortion indicate that performing abortions is an intensely personal
experience, which often brings with it significant psychological bur-
dens. These burdens would presumably be greatly intensified for a
healthcare provider who believes she is taking innocent human life,
and they provide a final argument for a constitutional conscience
right.
D. Refusal and Psychological Harm to Providers
As set forth in more detail above, the Court's decisions in Roe and
Casey expressly emphasize the importance of protecting women from
the mental and psychological burdens they might face in the absence
of an abortion right.22 4 The Court in Roe explained that the absence
of an abortion right could subject women to psychological harm
including "a distressful life and future" and the "continuing stigma of
unwed motherhood."2 2 5 The Court in Casey emphasized that the
abortion decision is fraught with psychological consequences for the
pregnant woman and noted that a woman who regretted her abortion
decision may face "devastating psychological consequences."2 6
Medical staff asked to provide or assist with abortions also face
significant psychological consequences-even when they strongly sup-
port a woman's right to choose to have an abortion. In fact, some
abortion providers have begun to publicly call for efforts to address
abortion's psychological impact on those who perform them. For
example, Dr. Lisa Harris-an abortion provider and professor of
223 For a collection of stories of healthcare professionals who refused to partici-
pate in procedures that violated their consciences, see Real-Life Examples of Discrimina-
tion in Healthcare, CHRISTIAN MED. ASs'N, http://freedom2care.org/docLib/20100920
_Reallifestories.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (recounting stories about claimed dis-
crimination for such refusals, including many related to abortion).
224 See supra Part I.B.3.
225 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
226 Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
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medicine at the University of Michigan-explains that performing
abortions can be a "brutally visceral" and "raw" experience, and can
cause "serious emotional reactions that produce[ ] physiological
symptoms, sleep disturbances (including disturbing dreams), effects
on interpersonal relationships and moral anguish."2 2 7
Studies of abortion providers suggest that Dr. Harris's exper-
iences are not unique. For example, in a 1974 study, many providers
reported "[o]bsessional thinking about abortions, depression, fatigue,
anger, lowered self-esteem, and identify conflicts."2 28 A 1989 study
reported similar effects:
Ambivalent periods were characterized by a variety of otherwise
uncharacteristic feelings and behaviors including withdrawal from
colleagues, resistance to going to work, lack of energy, impatience
with clients and an overall sense of uneasiness. Nightmares, images
that could not be shaken and preoccupation were commonly
reported. Also common was the deep and lonely privacy within
which practitioners had grappled with their ambivalence.22 9
Anecdotal evidence from abortion providers is remarkably consis-
tent with these studies. For example, one study conducted by an abor-
tion provider of his staff reported employees feeling "that the
emotional strain affected interpersonal relationships significantly or
227 Harris, supra note 1, at 76 (quoting Warren Hern & Billie Corrigan, What About
Us? Staff Reactions to D&E, 15 ADVANCES IN PLANNED PARENTHOOD, no. 1, 1980 at 3).
Dr. Harris described the intensely personal experience of performing an abortion for
a patient while she herself was pregnant:
With my first pass of the forceps, I grasped an extremity and began to pull it
down. I could see a small foot hanging from the teeth of my forceps. With a
quick tug, I separated the leg. Precisely at that moment, I felt a kick-a
fluttery "thump, thump" in my own uterus. It was one of the first times I felt
fetal movement. There was a leg and foot in my forceps, and a "thump,
thump" in my abdomen. Instantly, tears were streaming from my eyes-
without me-meaning my conscious brain-even being aware of what was
going on. I felt as if my response had come entirely from my body, bypassing
my usual cognitive processing completely. A message seemed to travel from
my hand and my uterus to my tear ducts. It was an overwhelming feeling-a
brutally visceral response-heartfelt and unmediated by my training or my
feminist pro-choice politics. It was one of the more raw moments in my life.
Id. Dr. Harris continues to provide abortions and asserts that the "moral status [of
the fetus] is reasonably the subject of much disagreement" and that individual "doc-
tors still need to sort out for themselves" the circumstances under which they will
perform abortions." Id. at 74-75.
228 Marianne Such-Baer, Professional Staff Reaction to Abortion Work, Soc. CASEWORK,
at 435-36 (July 1974).
229 Kathleen M. Roe, Private Troubles and Public Issues Providing Abortion Amid Com-
peting Definitions, 29 Soc. ScI. MED. 1191, 1197 (1989).
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resulted in other behavior such as an obsessive need to talk about the
experience." Many other informal studies report providers tormented
by horrifying dreams.2 3 0  Because of these types of psychological
effects, at least one post-residency abortion training program has initi-
ated an annual psychological workshop for its fellows in order to help
them deal with the psychological impact of performing abortions. 231
These accounts indicate that the Court was correct when it sug-
gested in Casey that the abortion decision was "fraught with conse-
quences" for the healthcare providers asked to provide abortions. 232
The psychological consequences detailed above-all reported by prac-
titioners who support the availability of abortion-may be expected to
be worse for a physician who believes that providing an abortion is the
wrongful taking of an innocent human life.2 33 For example, one
nurse allegedly forced by a private hospital to participate in an abor-
tion reported that the experience left her feeling "violated, betrayed,
like I had been raped," and that she had undergone "extreme emo-
tional, psychological and spiritual suffering."234 She described the
trauma of being "forced to watch the doctor remove the bloody arms
and legs of the child from its mother's body with forceps" and being
forced to "carry those body parts to another area of the operating
room. . . . It felt like horror film unfolding."235
230 See, e.g., H.D. Kibel, Editorial Staff Reactions to Abortion, 39 OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY 1 (1972) ("Their distress was typified by one nurse's dream. This involved an
antique vase she had recently wished to purchase. In the dream she was stuffing a
baby into the mouth of the vase. The baby was looking at her with a pleading expres-
sion."); Hern & Corrigan, supra note 227, at 5 ("Two respondents described dreams
which they had related to the procedure. Both described dreams of vomiting fetuses
along with a sense of horror . . . . In general it appears that the more direct the
physical and visual involvement (i.e., nurses, doctor) the more stress experienced.");
Sallie Tisdale, We Do Abortions Here, HARPER'S MAG., Oct. 1987, 66, 70 ("I have fetus
dreams, we all do here: dreams of abortions one after the other; of buckets of blood
splashed on the walls; trees full of crawling fetuses. I dreamed that two men grabbed
me and began to drag me away. 'Let's do an abortion,' they said with a sickening leer,
and I began to scream, plunged into a vision of sucking, scraping pain, of being
spread and torn by impartial instruments that do only what they are bidden. I woke
from this dream barely able to breathe .... ). All of the study authors supported
abortion availability at the time of their writing. See RACHEL M. MACNAIR, PERPETRA-
TION-INDUCED TRAUMATIC STRESS 76 (2002).
231 MACNAIR, supra note 230, at 75.
232 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992)
233 See MAcNAIR, supra note 230, at 71 (noting that the psychological conse-
quences of abortion would be expected to be worse "if abortion is the taking of a
human life" than if abortion is "not violence at all.").
234 Julia Duin, Nurse Sues After Aiding Abortion, Says Hospital Violated Conscience Pro-
tections, WASH. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at Al8.
235 Id.
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Recognition of a healthcare provider's right to refuse to perform
abortions would avoid governmental imposition of such psychological
harms, a factor which the Courts in Roe, Doe, and Casey all emphasized
in finding a constitutional abortion right.
CONCLUSION
A Fourteenth Amendment conscience right in the abortion con-
text is particularly important now, as the nation moves forward with
large-scale changes to its healthcare system, and as interest groups
urge the government to require participation in abortions. The
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, for example,
has asked Congress to require healthcare providers to refer for abor-
tions23 6 and has issued ethical directives dictating that objecting prov-
iders should be forced to perform abortions "regardless of the
provider's personal moral objections" whenever refusal even "might
negatively have an impact on a patient's . . . mental health" or "a
patient's conception of well-being."2 37 Both the historical account
above and the autonomy logic of Roe and Casey demonstrate that deci-
sions about whether to participate in abortions generally, or whether
to perform them to protect a patient's "conception of well-being," fall
236 See, e.g., News Release, Am. Ass'n of Pro-life Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
Statement on ACOG Letter Urging U.S. Senators to Violate the Rights of Conscience
of Physicians (Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://www.aaplog.org/physician-con-
science-rights/news-release-statement-on-acog-letter-urging-u-s-senators-to-violate-the-
rights-of-conscience-of-physicians.
237 ETHICS OPINION, supra note 28, at 1, 3, 5. Likewise, the ACLU has recently
urged the federal government to require performance of abortions that are necessary
to protect the life and health of the pregnant woman. See Letter from Laura W. Mur-
phy, ACLU, et al. to Marilyn Tavenner, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(July 1, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Letter toCMSFinal
PDF.pdf (arguing that religiously affiliated hospitals "cannot invoke their religious
status to jeopardize the health and lives of pregnant women seeking medical care.").
While there are of course some situations that are true life and death emergencies,
the category of abortions considered necessary for health reasons has generally been
defined quite broadly by the Supreme Court to include "all factors-physical, emo-
tional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the
patient. All these factors may relate to health." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192
(1973); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("Maternity, or additional off-
spring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm
may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is
also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is
the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and
otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and
continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the
woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.").
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squarely within the conscience right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Recognition of a constitutional right to refuse in these cases, of
course, does not necessarily mean the right is absolute. Other consti-
tutional interests can be impinged if the government can show the
burden is necessary to serve a sufficiently compelling governmental
interest,238 and presumably the government would be permitted to
argue it has such interests in certain emergencies. Still, any such argu-
ment would need to begin with a governmental explanation as to why
the government needs to forcibly conscript unwilling providers rather
than providing the service directly by hiring willing providers, or by
giving willing providers incentives to operate in underserved commu-
nities rather than more profitable urban centers. In the vast majority
of cases, it would likely be impossible for the government to demon-
strate that an interest is sufficiently compelling to trump the constitu-
tional right to refuse, yet not quite compelling enough to justify direct
government provision of or expenditures for the service.239
More broadly, acknowledgment that the Fourteenth Amendment
can protect individuals from being forced to do what they understand
to be killing raises interesting questions for other constitutional issues.
For example, while the Supreme Court has determined that capital
punishment is permissible under the Eighth Amendment, is there a
historical case to be made that the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Casey/Lawrence self-definition right should protect unwilling individu-
als from being compelled to participate in capital punishment, either
as jurors, as witnesses, or as participants? Would similar logic protect
238 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) ("[T]he Four-
teenth Amendment 'forbids the government to infringe ... fundamental liberty inter-
ests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'" (citation omitted)); Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (noting
that a content-based speech restriction could be constitutional if the state can "show
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end").
239 Cf Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988) (noting that
a compelled speech requirement was not narrowly tailored because "the State may
itself" make the statements and thereby "communicate the desired information to the
public without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech"). For example, in Mor-
Fitz v. Blagojevich, the trial court found that a government requirement that pharma-
cies sell emergency contraceptives failed strict scrutiny under the First Amendment in
part because the government failed to demonstrate that it could not serve its interest
with less restrictive measures, such as "providing the drug directly, or by using its
websites, phone numbers and signs to help customers find willing sellers." Morr-Fitz,
Inc. v. Blagojevich, No. 2005-000495, at 7 (7th Cir. Ill. Apr 5, 2011).
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doctors and pharmacists from being compelled to participate in
assisted suicide where that practice is legal? Does the Fourteenth
Amendment require a provision in a draft law for conscientious objec-
tors, a question that has not been addressed in the post-Roe substan-
tive due process era? Moreover, if the Casey/Lawrence "mystery of life"
analysis is found to include a substantive due process right to same-sex
marriage, would there be a concomitant conscience right for those
with a different view to avoid government compulsion to participate in
or facilitate such marriages?
The answers to these questions would depend on historical and
legal analysis that is beyond the scope of this Article. Thus it is impos-
sible at this stage to define the precise outer contours of the Four-
teenth Amendment's protection of conscience. But wherever that
outer boundary should ultimately be established, for the reasons set
forth above, it is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment includes some
protection of conscience, and that protection at least includes the
right to make one's own decisions about personal participation in the
central substantive due process issue of our time: abortion.
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